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ABSTRACT 
The Elective Conference of the African National Congress (ANC) of 2007 that took place in Polokwane 
remains an important event since 1994 (Fikeni 2009). The economic policy of the ANC and candidature 
of Mbeki and Zuma for the presidency contributed to the growing of factionalism in the ruling party 
that culminated in the 2007 conference. The study investigates and analyses the development of 
factions and ideological contestations that seemed to punctuate the ANC towards its 2007 National 
Congress that took place in Polokwane. 
It examines the roots and causes of factionalism in the ANC with a specific focus on the Nelson 
Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM). It also investigates the extent to which the conservative policies 
such as Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) contributed in the divisions and factionalism 
prior the 2007 polokwane conference. The study departs from the premise that history of the ANC is 
riddled with factionalism and ideological contestations that have been well documented. 
Furthermore, the political infighting within the ANC impacts on governance structures and the local 
government level. The study seeks to demonstrate the effects of the 2007 power contestations 
between Zuma and Mbeki on the NMBM. To this effect, the study demonstrates how the leadership 
contestations in the ruling party impacted on the service delivery in the city.  For the purposes of 
analyzing and making sense of the nature of power plays within the ANC it draws from the theories of 
factionalism to illustrate that the link between the growing of factionalism and the one party dominant 
system. 
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                                                         Chapter One 
                                                                         
                                                          Contextualising the study  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
The study investigates and analyses the development of factions and ideological contestations that 
seemed to punctuate the African National Congress (ANC) at its 2007 National Congress that took place 
in Polokwane.  It examines the root causes of factionalism in the ANC with a specific focus on the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM). It also investigates the extent to which the conservative 
policies such as Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) contributed in the divisions and 
factionalism in the 2007 ANC Polokwane Conference. More importantly, the study unpacks the impact 
of GEAR policy and related matters to the candidature of Jacob Zuma and Thabo Mbeki at the ANC 
Elective Conference of 2007. 
 
The study proceeds from the premise that the history of the ANC is riddled with factionalism and 
ideological contestations that have been well documented by scholars such as Butler (2007); Fikeni 
(2009); Gevisser (2007); Gumede (2009, 2007); Kagwanja (2008); and Legassick (2007).  For example, 
the first breakaway from the ANC led by Robert Sobukwe to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) in 
1959 was fuelled, among other things, by what they saw as the ‘undue influence of communists and 
non-blacks in the struggle for African liberation’ (McKinley: 1997: 26). During the Morogoro 
Conference of 1969 factional tendencies emerged, and culminated in a blistering attack on Oliver 
Tambo, then president of the organization. The attack was based, among other things, on the lack of 
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military engagement with the enemy (Callinicos: 2004: 339). The word enemy during the struggle was 
towards the Nationalist Party government though not limited. Furthermore, the formation of the 
Congress of the People (COPE) in 2008, another breakaway group from the ANC illustrates the  
history of factionalism in the ANC.  In the early 1990s, after the unbanning of the ANC, use of semantics 
such as ‘doves’ and ‘hawks’ were used to mark factions along ideological lines. Interestingly, the 
semantics were also applied to mark conformists and non-conformists in the organisations in terms of 
toeing the party line. The ANC economic policy remains a contestant terrain within the Tripartite 
Alliance 1 (Booysen 2011). The next section unpacks the extent to which ideological differences 
impacted on the candidature for the presidency at the Polokowane conference of 2007. 
 
1.2 The economic policy as an area for contestation    
 
The adoption by the South Africa’s government in 1996 of an economic policy described by its critics as 
‘conservative’ and ‘neoliberal’  known as Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), 
demonstrated a sharp shift from the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) (Habib & 
Padayachee; 2000:245). GEAR policy is a government macro-economic blueprint and it “represents the 
very opposite of a socialist vision or revolutionary romanticism” (Adam, Slabber and Moodley; 1997: 
206).  The general sentiment is that GEAR was forced upon Tripartite members, and was unlike the RDP 
which was the product of inputs from the Tripartite Alliance partners and which is why the adoption of 
                                                          
1
 Tripartite Alliance consists of the African National Congress (ANC), South African Communist Party (SACP) and Congress of 
South of South African Trade Unions. 
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GEAR angered the members of the Tripartite Alliance and created tensions in the Alliance (Legassick: 
2007:518).  
 
 The ANC shift from its original economic policy and Freedom Charter, which had a Marxian flavour, to 
the orthodox economic mainstream, finds resonance with what Giddens (1994) refers to as ‘economic 
evolution’. In this context, ‘economic evolution’ refers to the adoption of economic policies that are 
diametrically opposed to the objectives of the National Democratic Revolution (NDR) held by the ANC 
during the liberation struggle. The adoption of the GEAR policy by the government in 1996 was 
indicative of this policy evolution, by embracing what its critics referred to as a ‘neoliberal agenda’ 
(Bond: 2000, Calland: 2006, Gevisser: 2007, Turok: 2008).   
 
Though the analysis by Giddens is developed in a different context, it provides a useful theoretical 
framework from which to examine economic changes in South Africa. It also offers an insightful 
detailed account of how forces of the market and the called ‘Washington Consensus’ impacted on the 
formulation of economic policies,  particularly in Third World countries. The use of words such as 
‘neoconservative’ and ‘new right’ helps to examine these policies. The phrases are useful in the sense 
that they help to decode the philosophical underpinnings of the economic shifts in the Third World, 
and the forces behind the changes. GEAR, as an economic policy adopted by the ruling party, revealed 
signs of operating within a capitalist framework that accommodated the ‘post-Cold War Washington 
Consensus’ (Evaratt; 2008:303). It is worth noting that the tensions in the Tripartite Alliance have been 
attributed to the economic and policy changes adopted by the ANC, and which became a contestant 
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terrain, given different views that emerged in the Tripartite Alliance of the ruling party: Butler (2007); 
Fikeni (2009); Gumede (2009); Southall (2003, 2007).  
The policy shift was perceived as an abandonment of the RDP to GEAR, and could be located in what 
Giddens (1994: 33) describes as ‘New Right’. According to Giddens (1994: 13) the philosophical 
underpinnings of this ‘New Right’ are found in “neoliberalism since economic markets play a role in 
them”. In South Africa’s context it simply means the adoption of conservative economic policies and 
discarding of socialist rhetoric that dictated policy during the struggle for liberation prior to 1994. The 
adoption of the GEAR policy, which is symptomatic of a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), 
created tensions in the Tripartite Alliance and contributed considerably in the factional tendencies 
between was has become known as ‘intra-left’ and ‘intra-right’ in the ANC (Fikeni; 2009: 5). In this 
context, political opponents of Thabo Mbeki rallied support for the economic policy adopted by the 
government in 1996. There were rancorous debates in the Alliance sparked by the lack of consultation 
in the formulation and implementation of the policy (Prevost; 2006: 173).  
 
 
The adoption of GEAR by the government in 1996, the perceived lack of intervention in the HIV/AIDS 
epidemic, and the leadership style of Thabo Mbeki, are some of the issues that were used to 
emasculate his chances in the ANC presidential race (Booysen 2011; Mathekga (2009). The campaign 
for the new leadership that was going to be elected in Polokwane in 2007 was by and large focused on 
the need to have incumbents in the top structures of the ANC who would be sensitive to the historical 
mission of the National Democratic Revolution (NDA). It was against this backdrop that the 52nd 
Congress of the ANC was perceived by its grassroots constituency as a crucial moment in terms of 
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effecting the necessary changes in the organisation. In that context, Zuma was constructed as a leftist 
who would take forward the neglected historical mission of the ANC, despite the lack of historical 
evidence to corroborate this (Friedman 2009).   
 
The NDR as a strategy and tactic emerged from various policy conferences during the ANC history. The 
Morogoro Conference in 1969, adopted a ‘Strategy and Tactics’ policy document (Turok; 2008: 23). The 
strategy and Tactics document was a broader political strategy to ensure that revolutionary battles 
were fought on all possible fronts, involving not just an army, but the mass of oppressed people 
(Legassick, 2007; Turok, 2008). This particular policy document continues to be a flagship policy of the 
ANC because it serves as a point of reference in its strategic objectives. In other words, each 
conference held by the organisation since its establishment in 1912 shaped it in terms of strategic 
values and positions. What distinguished the Polokwane conference from other ANC National 
Congresses is that it was unlike previous conferences where delegates would go to the conference 
knowing who would be elected to the top leadership positions, and it was also going to enable 
delegates to choose leader in a hotly contested battle between the Mbeki and the Zuma camp 
(Gumede: 2005, 2008; Fikeni: 2009. The leadership contest for ANC Presidency between Mbeki and 
Zuma, demonstrated a shift in the organisation’s internal elective processes. 
 
The lobbying of candidates to be elected at the 2007 conference centred on their position regarding 
economic policy. Aubrey Mashiqi (SABC interview October 19 2008) noted that “factionalism was so 
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institutionalised in the ANC prior to the conference”2 implying that it was going to be difficult for the 
factions to reconcile after the conference because of the deep divisions created by the leadership 
tussle. Nceba Faku, former Mayor of NMBM, who initially canvassed support for Tokyo Sexwale before 
the conference, changed sides to Zuma’s camp because of the failure to mount sufficient support for 
their candidate, and the hostility encountered from the supporters of Mbeki and Zuma3. The above-
mentioned potential candidates such as Sexwale, Ramaphosa and Phosa left politics to join the 
business sector and were also considered to be Mbeki’s political opponents (Mangcu; 2007: 148). 
Likewise, Lodge (2003:210) observed that: 
 
Any hopeful contenders for eventual succession to Mbeki who might have wanted to  
position themselves for the competition for the presidency at the 2007 conference  
may well have been discouraged by the treatment meted out to former pretenders  
to ANC leadership in 2001. In April 2001, Steve Tshwete announced that he had ordered  
a police investigation into the alleged circulation of rumours by Matthews Phosa, Cyril  
Ramaphosa and Tokyo Sexwale that Mbeki had been implicated in the 1992 conspiracy  
to murder Chris Hani.     
 
This was perceived as a strategy to discourage any potential candidates from competing with Mbeki for 
the leadership position. It was the responsibility of the branches of the ANC organisation concerned to 
nominate candidates for positions. Mbeki’s candidacy for leadership was (mis)construed as a 
deliberate attempt to frustrate Zuma’s chances of becoming the next president (Butler 2007; Fikeni 
                                                          
2
 Aubrey Mashiqi expressed this view during the SABC interview October 19 2008. 
3
 Personal communication between myself and Nceba Faku prior to the 52
nd
 ANC national conference. 
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2009; Mangcu 2007).  Conversely, Alliance partners saw Zuma as the man who would be sensitive to 
their cause, as they felt neglected by Mbeki (Fikeni; 2009: 8; Legassick; 2007: 535).  
 
The nomination of Zuma and Mbeki by the branches of the ANC precipitated the succession contest. In 
the light of the factional interests, the candidates, and their seniority in the ANC influenced the tone of 
the campaigns by the respective camps. The campaigns were also stepped up by Mbeki and Zuma 
indicating that they would be available to serve as leaders of the ANC, should they be nominated; 
Booysen (2011); Fikeni (2009); Mathekga (2008). However, the opponents of Thabo Mbeki in the ANC 
and the ANC Youth League in particular, argued that electing Mbeki as the leader of the ANC would 
create two centres of power, as his term as the president of the country was coming to an end a year 
and few months after the 2007 ANC Polokwane Congress.  
 
This notion of two centres of power was also steeped in the faction politics of the ruling party, as it 
appeared as the norm that characterised the ANC at its 2007 Congress in Polokwane. Jacob Zuma’s 
corruption charges by the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) placed the ANC in a difficult position.4 
It allowed the presentation of the corruption charges to be construed by supporters of Zuma as a tactic 
to prevent him from succeeding Mbeki as leader of the ANC. Zuma himself claimed that he had been 
treated shabbily by the NPA (Fikeni; 2009: 5; Ralo; 2007).  
 
                                                          
4
 This point was also made by Thabo Mbeki, former president of the ANC and the Republic of South Africa, in a letter 
addressed to Jacob Zuma president of the ANC and he contended that for some years now our movement has had to 
manage an immensely challenging and unprecedented situation, occasioned by the criminal charges preferred against you 
by the National Prosecuting Authority and related matters, October 9, 2008. 
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On closer examination, the divide between Mbeki and Zuma in the ANC created by the factional 
interests presented far deeper issues than appeared on the surface (Fikeni; 2009: 5). It seems the 
struggle between the two camps was about what Gumede (2005) called the battle for the soul of the 
ANC.  The present study departs from the premise that the divide that continues to plague the ruling 
party is a testimony to the change in the character and tradition of the ANC in terms of discipline and 
its ability to unite different tendencies. What was at stake and defended by Mbeki’s camp was the 
protection of the legacy which he had painstakingly built during his tenure as president of South Africa 
based on ‘African Renaissance’, which became key for South Africa’s foreign policy. Zuma’s supporters 
rallied support, among other issues, on the failures of the economic policy adopted to create job 
opportunities and the alleviation of poverty (Seidman-Makgetla; 2004: 268). The leftist factions 
between the Tripartite Alliance partners relied on the poorly defined economic rhetoric, and the 
thought that Zuma would be the right person to serve their interests owing to his leadership qualities, 
such as his accessibility and down-to-earth approach. Zuma is respected in the ANC and in the 
Tripartite Alliance owing to his ability to listen to the concerns of the people, and to his consensus style 
of leadership. These are some of the issues that defined the power struggle in the organisation, and 
were used to dislodge each other at the Polokwane conference (Fikeni: 2009: 5).  
 
Essentially, ideological differences divided the ANC into what became commonly known as the Zumites 
and the Mbekites on the Road to Polokwane. For instance, the support Zuma received from the leftist 
factions in the Tripartite Alliance and in the ANC demonstrated that he was seen as the ‘friend of the 
left’. However, there are different perspectives and opinions about the perceived ideological 
differences between the Mbeki and the Zuma camp. The tension between the two camps was dressed 
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up as ‘ideological differences’ which usually disguised a battle for power and positions (Friedman; 
2009). It will be interesting to demonstrate in the coming sections of this research study whether there 
is ideological tag or not that can be attached to Mbeki and Zuma. Is their different style of leadership 
amounts to ideological differences? The research will attempt to uncover how these perceived 
ideological differences were negotiated at the NMBM as it was engulfed by factionalism at the 
Polokwane Congress. On the issue of ideological differences, Pillay (2010: 6) argues that “…it would be 
difficult to find a policy quarrel between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma because they worked closely 
together closely, and are said to subscribe to the same political school of thought. On the same issue 
Suttner (2010: 25) has this to say “There is very little difference in content in the Mbeki and Zuma 
vision. It is in fact a broadly common programme which is being pursued, with a difference in style” 
Nceba Faku5 points out that, “There is no there is no ideological tag; it is just different styles of 
leadership, that’s all. Have you seen anything fundamentally different between Zuma and Mbeki?” But 
the question remains to be examined is; how then did Zuma emerge as the symbol that represents ‘the 
left’ of the tripartite alliance partners? (Pillay; 2010: 6). To get a better insight to the subject under 
study it is worth citing Pillay (2010: 5) at length 
 
Jacob Zuma is the name of a confluence of different forces, interests and pasts that  
intersect to name him… I prefer then to think of events as marking confluences, of  
ruptures, of congealing and dissolving, of a multiplicity of things that are constantly  
coming together and coming part… as within the webs that have been spun around  
him that congealed into the political tsunami, but who’s fragile unity is scattered all  
                                                          
5
 Personal communication between myself and Nceba Faku before the Polokwane Conference 
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over the shores.        
The presidency of Zuma as explained by Pillay represents less in terms of strategic values espoused by 
the ANC but a conduit to access state resources. More importantly, it reflected the nature the 
character of faction that supported his ANC presidency. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement 
 
The main aim of this study is to conduct an exploratory examination of the driving forces that 
culminated in the factionalism that characterised the 52nd ANC at Polokwane. In this sense, the study 
seeks to document the rationality and motivations behind the contestation of power in the ANC. In 
order to contextualise the rationale and driving factors, and keep debates within manageable units, the 
study will focus on the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan Municipality (NMBM) as a case-study. Though 
the study will focus locally but the discussions will be linked with other broader issues that form part of 
the subject under discussion. It will examine the extent to which the economic policy differences 
within the Tripartite Alliance impacted on the leadership race for the ANC presidency. 
 
The political infighting and power struggle in the ANC along the factional lines at the NMBM continued 
to take place after the Polokwane conference, which reflected deep divisions in the ruling party. The 
simmering tensions between Mbeki’s and Zuma’s supporters reflected the level of apprehension 
caused by the succession battle in the ANC before the Polokwane National Congress. In essence, the 
results of the ANC National Congress gave the Zuma camp the upper hand and they sought to exercise 
their political muscle by removing people perceived to be Zuma’s political nemesis in strategic 
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positions in the municipality. In other words, the municipality as a government institution for service 
delivery became a terrain for the contestation of factions and the formation of COPE worsened the 
tensions. Booysen (Business Day, April 2009) notes that, “state employees were often vulnerable, 
courtesy of either being deployed under Mbeki’s auspices, or associated with COPE” Quintessentially, 
the pressure to reshuffle the mayoral committee was seen as an attempt by Zuma’s group to reassert 
itself and take political control of the city. These threats increased in an unprecedented manner after 
the regional conference under the leadership of Nceba Faku, former Mayor and supporter of Zuma, 
but were not carried owing to differences existing in the organisation, and the intervention of the ANC 
provincial leadership. The intra-party divisions in the ruling party along factional lines ran the risk of 
affecting the service delivery because elected ANC councillors serving in the NMBM were municipality 
figures were embroiled in the factions.  
 
 
1.4 Rationale and Motivation 
 
As the time was drawing near for the ANC 52nd National Congress that took place in Polokwane in 2007, 
the lobbying was not only intensifying nationally but also locally. Fikeni (2009: 3) describes this 
Congress as a “watershed moment and, by all accounts, the most significant event since 1994”. The 
ANC departed from its tradition of managing contestations for leadership positions, so as to enhance 
internal democracy within the party.  The unprecedented divisions in the ANC in the NMBM caused by 
factionalism were an epitome of the national politics towards the National Congress. There were 
largely due to the fact that members of the ANC from national to the local level were canvassing for 
support for their preferred candidates to be elected in the top positions during the congress 
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What heightened tensions and factionalism ahead of the Congress was the fact that the contest for the 
leadership positions was going to be an open competition which demonstrated a sharp shift from the 
ANC tradition (Fikeni; 2009: 10). The following sections will unpack the build-up to the congress, and 
although the study will draw from the national politics for the purposes of debate but it will focus on 
NMBM. 
 
1.5 Contextualising and Delimitation of the Study 
 The study is concerned with the ANC economic policy as a terrain for contestation, candidature and 
factionalism. It investigates the extent to which factionalism shaped the leadership contest for position 
in the Metro. ???? but it will address issues like HIV/AIDS which were enmeshed in the contest for 
leadership. The Hefer Commission was appointed by President Mbeki to determine the authenticity of 
the allegations that Bulelani Ngcuka, then head of the NPA had become a terrain for the leadership 
battle of the ruling party. 
 
1.6 Research Objectives 
 
1. This study seeks to document and track the contestation of power in the African National Congress 
as it embarked on what is known as the Road to Polokwane in 2007, with a focus on candidature. 
2. It will contextualise the factions and divisions that characterise the African National Congress in the 
Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. 
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3. It will assess the relationship between the state and the ruling party of the African National Congress 
in the context of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality in the aftermath of the 2007 ANC Polokwane 
Congress.  
4. It will focus on the extent to which economic policy of the ANC impacted on the candidature for the 
presidency of the ANC during the 2007 Elective Conference in Polokwane. 
 
1.7 Methodology and Approach 
 
McGaw and Watson (1976:4) define research methodology as the “description, and justification of 
various methods of conducting research… It is concerned with establishing the standards by which 
research can be judged” One of the fundamental aspects regarding the qualitative method as a 
scientific technique is that it provides guidelines for establishing criteria by which reality may be 
conceived and explained with the smallest amount of disagreement (Smith and Paulsen; 1976: 97). 
Similarly, Maykut and Morehouse (1994:21) note that “the goal of qualitative research is to discover 
patterns which emerge after close observation, careful documentation, and thoughtful analysis of the 
research topic. What can be discovered by qualitative research is not sweeping generalisation but 
contextual findings. The process of discovery is basic to the philosophic understanding of the 
qualitative approach”. According to Morse (1994:1) qualitative methods “smooth out those 
contradictions and are in themselves a mysterious combination of strategies for collecting images of 
reality”. The qualitative method is well suited for this study since it examines power plays and 
factionalism as phenomenona. Manifestations of phenomenona such as the ones under study in 
political parties require description, so as to be well understood. 
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It is the nature of the social science studies to determine causal factors that could trigger different 
views, and given the nature of this study that seeks to explore factionalism within the ANC, the 
qualitative methodology will allow the researcher to structure the perceived realities that acted as 
driving forces on the Road to Polokwane, and its subsequent impact on the lower levels of government 
in the NMBM. One can read similar meaning in Maphai’s (1994: 42) contention that “as far as social 
science is concerned, it is notoriously difficult, if not impossible, to locate with any degree of exactness, 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for any event”. Since the Road to Polokwane was marked by 
complicated sets of power plays or struggles within struggles in the organization, the proposed study 
will trace cues and, signs at the conference of such economic policy and candidature.  
 
A study of this nature allows the researcher to readjust as the context and situation change and this 
point to another dimension of the qualitative method. Creswell (2003: 181) notes that “qualitative 
research emerges rather than tightly figures”. This is particularly relevant to the subject to be 
researched, because political settings are constantly changing and are influenced by multiple factors. 
This is going to be the case with this study because it is dealing with the ongoing phenomenona. It is 
demonstrated clearly in the theoretical framework chapter on factionalism as a phenomenon, and how 
it keeps transforming itself depending on the issues and interests of the political actors. 
1.8 Methods and Techniques 
 
Given the nature of the study elite interviews will be conducted. Lilleker (2003: 207) describes the term 
‘elite interview’ as “the staple method for getting inside the subject”. Similarly, McEvoy (2006: 184) 
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explains that “interviewing is a key data collection technique used in political science research to 
access the views and interpretations of subjects under investigation”. Similarly, Beamer (2002:86) 
states that “elite interviews offer political scientists a rich, cost-effective vehicle for generating unique 
data to investigate the complexities of policy and politics… Given elite interviews’ ability to generate 
highly reliable and valid data, they have been a staple of state politics research”. The elite interviews 
have allowed the study to produce a deeper understanding on the subject investigated that cannot be 
found in books. Most importantly, they have enabled the investigator to interview actors who were 
close to action, or had access to the ruling party. This was particularly the case with the academics and 
bureaucrats close to the ruling elites.   
 
At the same time it enables the investigator to interact with the interviewees. An interview as a 
technique “…provides insights into events about which we know little; the activities that take place out 
of the public or media gaze, behind closed doors (Lilleker; 2003: 208). According to Fenno (1986:4) the 
most important function of the elite interview is the “immediate proximity to data about serious 
political activity which produces sensitivities and perspective which… do give observation some added 
quite possible for all political scientists who think about politicians”. The people interviewed reside 
within the NMBM and have some sort of relationship with the researcher which has developed over 
past years. For the purposes of accuracy, the interviews were recorded if permission was granted by 
the interviewee. Data analysis was informed by the emerging common trends that emanated from the 
interviews. They were conducted in English since the sample to be interviewed were competent in the 
language. Provision was made to allow them to express themselves in their home languages if they 
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wished to do so. The selected participants were interviewed in their personal capacities and not as 
representatives of their organisations. 
 
1.9 Sample and Data Analysis 
 
For this study it will be essential to conduct elite interviews. Lilleker (2003: 207) defines elites as “those 
with the close proximity to power or policymaking; the category includes all elected representatives, 
executive officers of organisations and senior staff officials”. In this context and given the purpose of 
the study interviews will focus on councillors from different formations as elected representatives 
because they constitute political players in the local government sphere. Senior officials will be 
selected because they are also responsible for implementing the political agenda of the ruling party. 
The study interviewed academics so as to get independent views and make a content analysis of 
newspaper clippings and the thematic approach based on the themes identified. Berg (1995:175) notes 
content analysis as “a technique for making inferences by systematically and objectively identifying 
special characteristics of images”. The interviews and clippings helped in terms of describing the 
phenomenon investigated.  
 
1.10 Presentation of the study 
 
Chapter 2 of the study will present a theoretical framework on factionalism and political parties. 
Chapter 3 will unravel the political contours of the ANC National Congress of 2007 that took place in 
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Polokwane and how the ideological contestations within the ruling party impacted on its internal 
elective process.  It will review the extent to which these dimensions impacted on the Tripartite 
Alliance up to the 2007 Polokwane Conference. Chapter 4 will focus on the two centres of power 
within the local government sphere, and determine how power manifested itself in the local politics. It 
will also focus on factionalism in the ANC at the local level, and its impact on the relationship between 
the state and the party, focusing on NMBM as the case-study. Chapter 5 will focus on the 
manifestation of trends and concluding remarks.   
 
1.11 Concluding Remarks 
 
The contest between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma for the ANC presidency set the pace for a 
leadership race, and augmented the tensions in the organisation. Chapter one has argued that, Mbeki’s 
nomination and his availability for the presidency were taken by his political opponents as an attempt 
to thwart Zuma’s chances becoming the president of the ANC and ultimately of the country. In 
addition, it was pointed out that the expulsion of Zuma as the country’s Deputy President fuelled 
tension caused much uproar in the Tripartite Alliance, and was used to weaken Mbeki’s chances to rule 
the organisation for the third time. Besides the candidature of Mbeki, which was viewed by the 
supporters of Zuma as problematic the economic policy which was adopted in 1996 under the 
leadership of Mandela became an issue in the leadership contest.  
 
The adoption of the GEAR policy by the government in 1996 without a comprehensive consultation,  
fuelled tensions in the Alliance. Part of the problem attributed to the policy was its failure to create  
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more jobs as promised. In fact, rightly or wrongly, it remains Mbeki’s political burden hence and was  
used against him by his political opponents during the jostle for presidency.                                                                         
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                                                                                Chapter Two 
                                       Understanding Political Factionalism: A Theoretical Overview 
 
2.1 Factionalism and Political Parties 
 
The political factionalism in parties that remain in power for a long period of time becomes inevitable 
as a phenomenon since the mobility and prospects of party members may be linked to factions they 
support. The current situation facing the ANC as a party in control of the state seems to signal the 
symptoms of a one-party dominant system. The fiercest leadership battles at all levels in the ruling 
party runs the risk of blurring the line between the state and party. The main of this chapter is to 
provide a theoretical framework from which to examine political factionalism as a phenomenon in the 
ruling organisation. The existence of factionalism in parties may not necessarily be an antithesis 
because of opportunities it may present to the members of political parties in terms of canvassing 
support for policy choices, but it seems to show itself as a permanent feature. 
 
Factionalism as a political phenomenon is considered as the most important aspect in the literature of  
politics. According to Belloni and Beller (1976:531), “faction is the one which occurs with a  
considerable frequency in the literature of politics and reference to specific faction and factionalism in  
a wide variety of contexts are common” Boucek (2009: 456) defines factionalism as a  
“multifaceted phenomenon which can transform itself over-time in response to incentives”.  Zariski  
(1960: 33) as cited by Kollner and Basedau (2005: 8) explains factions as “synonymous with any intra- 
party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and  
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common purpose and are organized to act collectively-as a district block within the party – to achieve  
their goals” It was particularly the case with respect to the development of factions during the ANC 
congress under discussion. It is often stated that there was nothing common among the faction 
members who mobilised support against Mbeki’s presidency except thwarting his chances. The cracks 
and disunity developed immediately after the conference and, illustrated that there was no long-term 
unity or bonding between them (Booysen 2011, Gumede 2012).  Waller and Gillespie (1995: 1) argue 
that “factions have generally been viewed as part of the pathology of politics” meaning that they give 
life and dynamism to party politics. In the case of the ANC as a ruling party it was the extent of factions 
that drew much attention to the 52nd Congress of the ANC that took place in Polokwane. 
Waller and Gillespie (1995 note further that  
…factions by definition lack the full organizational autonomy of parties; existing within  
parties in a particular organized form they necessarily pose problems for the party  
management…They may contribute to the life of a party or a breakaway formation in  
gestation in the womb of an existing party.  
 
This is particularly relevant in terms of understanding the nature of factions in the ANC as a dominant 
party in South Africa, and the conditions that gave rise to the phenomenon that is under study. 
Bettcher (2005: 340) defines factions as “any relatively organized group that exists within the context 
of some other group of and which… competes with the rivals for power advantages within the larger 
group which it is a part”. But what is not stated in the definitions cited above is the fact that the 
prevalence of factions is most common in parties that are in the reigns of power as is the case with the 
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ANC precisely because such organizations become important for access to state resources hence 
competition for positions are highly contested, and that give rise to factionalism. 
 
Despite the fact that factions are an integral part of politics it is noted that as a realm of politics they 
have been poorly developed as a category of enquiry and analysis in political science (Belloni and Beller 
1976; Boucek 2009; Maor 1997; Dewan and Squintani 2012). It is worth citing Dewani and Squintani 
(2012:2) that “factions are facts of life within most political parties. Yet despite their ubiquity, and 
importance of parties in restructuring collective choice, the role of factions has been largely ignored by 
political scientists”. In other words, factions as a study lack conceptual and theoretical grounding from 
which to develop arguments and examine the phenomenon. Morgenstern (2001: 237) is more 
forthright in arguing that “party theorists have generally ignored factions, viewing them as a 
ephemeral and thus generally unimportant”. This has contributed to the lack of theoretical lucidity 
with respect to the phenomenon. However, McAllister (1991: 208) has this to say on the definition of 
faction: “numerous definitions of factions have been suggested…,” for example, defining factions as 
“forces which compete for the acquisition of influence over the principal institutions of intra-party 
government, over the formulation of party policy, and over the selection of party leaders and party 
nominees for public office”. The definitions of factions seem to point to the fact that their 
manifestations are caused by the continuous shifting of the balance of forces in political organisations. 
Presently the faction that wooed support for Zuma prior to the Polokwane conference is deeply 
divided to the extent that some members of the same faction are beginning to consider an alternative 
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candidate for the 53rd Congress of the ANC. The differences on the preferred candidates did not come 
from the former supporters of Mbeki but from the same support base of Zuma.  
2.2 Causes of factions 
 
Although it cannot be explained with any degree of exactness there is a general consensus regarding 
matters that trigger the development of factions and factionalism in political parties. Boucek (2009: 
455-456) asserts that “political parties are not monolithic structures but collective entities in which 
competitions, divided opinions and dissent create internal pressures. In turn, these pressures often 
trigger the formation of factions that render the unitary actor assumption highly questionable”. It 
would be incorrect to assume that factions as a political phenomenon only exist in political parties that 
are in power, but factions in parties that are in power tend to be vicious owing to interests that 
members may have, since ruling parties control state resources, and that is why the ANC comes across 
as a party steeped in factionalism.  Pridham (1995: 11) alludes to the understanding of factions by 
arguing that “electoral success and party strength – alternatively, part weakness – are important in 
encouraging or discouraging factionalism; in particular, this is very likely to flourish in a dominant – 
party system, where the party in question control mechanisms of power over a lengthy period 
(patronage as a basis for factionalism) and represents a wide spread of socio-economic interests”. The 
view of Pridham’s is particularly relevant and useful in terms of unmasking the nature and precedents 
of factionalism in the ANC as a party that has been controlling the state apparatus for more than 18 
years and without an alternative party to unseat it. Its guaranteed future in power become a source of 
continuous and prolonged factions for benefitting in material terms hence the prevalence of 
competition among members of the same organisation which is the case in the ANC.    
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This view is also supported by Persico, Pueblita and Silverman (2011: 27) that “electoral dominant 
parties are more likely to develop factions”. This is because candidates are not elected directly by the 
constituencies as is the case in countries like the United States of America. Under the electoral system 
members elected to serve are accountable to the parties they represent, but not to the constituencies. 
Given the absence of strong opposition to the ANC as a ruling party and its future protects for 
remaining in power, the situation has given rise to factionalism in the party in an unprecedented 
manner in order to benefit from the material resources. The situation has resulted in fiercest 
competition among ANC members for positions, so as to have access to state resources for personal 
gains.  Similarly, Boucek (2010: 133) contends that “in sum, factional capture risks triggering a 
destructive cycle of factionalism…Parties that monopolise power for a very long time are particularly 
exposed to this risk…” The longer the prospects of the ANC being in power, the more it will get 
exposed to factional politics, which may not fit well with its character and the precepts of the National 
Democratic Revolution (NDA) because it is about changing the material conditions of the constituents 
it represents. But what is happening presently is total opposed what the organisation stands for in 
terms of its ideas which are clearly stated in its historical documents such as the one already cited as 
an example.  
 
Pridham (1995: 21) notes that “it is likely, therefore, that power or patronage factionalism emerges 
more in democratic consolidation, notably when given parties retain national offices over a lengthy 
period” The current situation in the ANC with respect factionalism and patronage provides a classical 
example from which to place the statement by Pridham taking into account the period it has been in 
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control of the state. In some cases, factions provide a platform for the sidelined citizens or for dissent 
in the political party to articulate policy matters and views on leadership choices. Baucek (2010: 133) 
has to this to say:  
 
…with the passage of time, leadership failures to reform or to resolve conflicts and address intra-party 
 grievances may motivate those who are on the losing side in the competition for the representational  
and policy claims to mobilise against the leadership and to set up separate factions. The strategy of  
discontented members are likely to be influenced by the degree of competition in the party system. 
 
Kollner and Basedau (2005: 9) add that “…see factions as an expression of deeply – rooted or 
institutionalized differentiation within parties”. The ANC is embroiled with factionalism at all levels 
which is a clear demonstration of deep divisions in the organisation.  However, Kellner and Basedau 
(2005: 12) point out that:  
With regard to the function of intra-party factions, many analysts have focused on the  
 
aspect of power struggles and distribution of ‘booty’ (spoils faction, power faction).  
 
Factions can help to advance the intra-party and governmental careers of their members  
 
and leaders. While the attainment of positions and allocations of posts can be termed the  
 
‘classical functions’ of factions…  
 
The argument by Kellner and Basedau alludes to the fact that factions exist mainly to safeguard the 
interests and careers of certain individuals as it is the case in the ANC. The practice in the ruling party 
to reward friends and supporters with positions is not difficult to find, and it entrenched factionalism 
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as a phenomenon. In most instances, the growth of the party is not a more important thing than their 
individual ambitions. The next section deals with the character of the factions or intra-party factions. 
 
2.3 The character of factions or intra-party factions 
 
Factions by their nature assume no formal role and status in the political parties, but exist chiefly to 
serve sectional interests. According to Belloni and Beller (1976: 535)  
…the looseness of faction organisations, characterizing it as a semi-visible (difficult  
to identify), irregular and unstable. Factions come into existence, and continue to  
exist, in an almost unconscious fashion, without careful, concerted planning by  
their members. Factions are, in addition, necessarily short lived organizations, fated  
to become visible only for a period of a single elections or a single issue, and then  
fade away or disappear, either permanently, or until they evolve into political parties.  
 
In some instances, factions are formed as a spontaneous response to party policies or disapproval of 
decisions taken or factions might be formed to challenge the sitting incumbents in charge of the 
political party. It could be argued that during Mbeki’s presidency factions in the ANC were triggered, 
among other issues, by the manner in which the party managed its internal processes, such decision 
making.  For instance, centralisation as opposed to modern democratic values characterised Mbeki’s 
presidency which meant that decisions on matters of strategic importance were located in his office 
which effectively robbed the ordinary members with an opportunity to participate or influence the 
party decisions.    
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Identification and public performance by factions could be very costly to the members concerned, and 
therefore their activities are organised surreptitiously. Such activities in the ANC are considered 
distractive, lacking legitimacy, and may generate trepidation in the incumbents in power or in a 
position of influence. This was abundantly demonstrated during the leadership tussle between Mbeki 
and Zuma before the ANC Elective Congress. Some members decided not to reveal their preferred 
candidates for the leadership positions because of the impact it might have on their careers. The use of 
state agencies such as the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) to monitor factions or members are 
perceived to be political nemesis contributed to the manner in which factions operate. The members 
involved might not be necessarily expelled from their parties as evident in the ANC, but their upward 
mobility in the party concerned will be frustrated if they are found to be backing a wrong candidate. 
Belloni and Beller (1976: 538) add that “cadres are important to factions, and are necessary, in order to 
facilitate any coordinated activity among faction members and thus, in effect, to give the faction some 
political strength… Internal communications are most critical…” For effectiveness and connectedness in 
the faction group it is always necessary to have members who enjoy support from the rank and file 
members of the party to garner support and momentum. The ability of the faction to convince 
members with pedigree has the potential to boost the prospects of the faction in terms of their 
influence. It has worked well for factions that exist within the ANC that managed to persuade 
respected members to be part of the group. For their continuity and existence factions rely on the 
influence they exert and compete with each other.  
Do factions operate and justify their existence on the basis of ideological differences or schisms within  
the political parties? In responding to this question, Belloni and Beller (1976: 538) argue that:  
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Ideological principles shared by faction members are most likely to derive from a  
specific interpretation of the principles of the party as a whole, and the commitment  
expressed to the party’s ideology to justify the actions of the factions in the face of  
criticisms of the faction by other elements in the party….leadership provides the  
faction with a focus and statures, and tactically, provides political brokerage as  
representatives of the faction’s interests in negotiations with other factions… 
 
Given the post-liberation character of the ANC in particular the period under review in the study it is 
not easy to term differences ideological in any meaningful way because of the competition for 
positions which translates into right to use state resources. Besides factions may be formed to display 
what is called in sociology ‘deviant behaviour’ meaning a deliberate choice not to conform with the set 
of standards outlined for members. Bettcher (2005: 343) notes persuasively that: 
 
Factions can help rank-and-file members discipline their leadership or help party  
leaders understand where their support or opposition lies within the party. The form  
of such two-way relationships between party leadership and rank and file are  
mediated by factional structures (or the lack thereof). Whether and how organized  
factionalism shapes the articulation of policy or interest preferences within the  
relationship is an interesting and important question. 
 
The assertion by Bettcher seems to suggest that the development of factions within the political 
parties must also be viewed in a positive light since it improves democratic processes within such 
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parties. Members of the ANC by virtue of belonging to a particular faction are able to influence policy 
positions and leadership preferences in the organisation. Andrew Leigh (2000: 427) in a study of the 
Australian Labour Party found that “every organisation, and certainly every political party, contains 
organised power grouping… The term faction which retains distinctly pejorative overtones in most 
political parties…”. That study seemed to help in debunking the negative connotations associated with 
factionalism in political parties as a phenomenon, by highlighting how the parties that were studied 
benefited from factionalism.    
 
On the same note, McAllister (1991: 206) writes that: 
 
Political factions have been viewed from a variety of perspectives in the past two  
centuries. In eighteen-century Europe and America, both factions and parties were  
regarded as subversive of the national interest. By the late nineteenth century, mass  
political parties had evolved fully from their factional beginnings and achieved political  
legitimacy, yet the term faction was still used in a pejorative sense. 
 
The statement indicates a shift from the dominant paradigm in terms of understanding the existence 
and function of factions in political parties. In most instances, if not all, factions are viewed as 
distractive without examining the brighter side. Politicians and scholars alike often refer to factionalism 
in dismissive and deplorable language.  McAllister (1991: 206) comments that “however, negative 
views of factions ignore the important functions they perform across a range of political systems. In 
democratic systems where one political party has been dominant for a long period, factions often 
provide the functional equivalent of competing parties” One of the challenging aspects regarding 
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factionalism is the question of ideology. The next section analyses whether factions can have 
ideological identity.   
2.4 Ideological identification 
 
One of the critical questions regarding factions within political parties is whether they exist and 
legitimise their existence on the basis of ideological inclination. The literature on the subject varies, 
and it points to different directions regarding the ideological contestations in the factions operating in 
political parties. According to Belloni and Beller (1976:539),  
Factions tend to endure, and tend to acquire some power vis-à-vis the parent  
organisation. Factional conflict centers around some broad, substantive ideological  
issue which calls into question the purpose of the parent organisation.  
 
Interestingly, Belloni and Beller (1976: 537) contradict this view by arguing that:  
 
The tendency alignments are therefore temporary and in a state of flux, producing  
shifts of individuals from one tendency to another. As new controversies arise, existing 
 tendency groups dissolve and alignments appear, uniting former enemies and dispersing  
former allies. Adherents to tendencies are not self-consciously organized, and do not  
expect to continue to operate as a group over any extended period of time. Individuals  
are free restraints that condition the behaviour of faction members, and make it easy  
for individuals to shift from tendency to tendency; indeed, individuals may be attached to  
conflicting tendencies, resolving their resulting cross-pressures in accordance with the  
dictates of the situations.   
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The contradictions in Belloni and Beller’s (1976 539) line of arguments with respect the ideological 
questions are further demonstrated in the argument that “in totalitarian movements in which 
legitimacy leadership inheres in ideological dogma, the conflicting interpretations of that dogma 
become the basis of factional divisions” Chambers cited in Belloni and Beller (1976: 543) suggests that 
“factions are more as a result of individuals forming followings around prominent leadership 
personalities; rarely…do factions have any consistent ideological base”. This is predominantly relevant 
to the ANC taking into account how factions were formed and consolidated to trump up support for 
respective candidates during the Polokwane Conference. The point made by Belloni and Beller makes 
perfect sense because some of the issues that give rise to factions within the organisations are not 
permanent features. In some instances it can be argued that it is spontaneity to a particular matter 
within the organization as was the case in challenging Mbeki’s presidency in the ANC.  
 
The usage of ideology is applied opportunistically to legitimise and lend credence to the existence of 
intraparty factions. Likewise, Dewam and Squintani (2012: 5) point out that, “factional alliances are 
formed due to immediate distributional concerns that need not correspondence to an ideological 
component”. It is further noted that “factions are ideological compact but differentiated party 
groupings that cohere around district leaders”. The underlying point here is that factions may exist 
without any ideological orientation that binds them but can be ignited by situational exigencies that 
might arise at a particular time. For instance, the candidature of Zuma and Mbeki for the ANC 
presidency contributed in the formation of factions at the Elective conference of 2007. The conditions 
in the ruling party with respect leadership struggles necessitated the formations of factions to woo 
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support for preferred incumbents for the leadership race and factions formed under such 
circumstances are expected to end after the mission has been achieved. In other words, they are not 
formed for a long term objectives. Do factions create any value and meaning in political parties? The 
following section replies to the question. 
2.5 The meaning of factions within political parties   
 
While it is generally assumed that intraparty factions and contestations within parties come across as 
disruptive and have a potential to cause conflicts there are varying views regarding the meaning and 
importance of factions. In attempting to unpack the meaning of factions within political parties 
Bettcher (2005: 343) opened a discussion: “A related question that has been debated is whether 
factions have functional or dysfunctional effects on parties and governance”.  Belloni and Beller 
(1976:542) in their study of factions found that, 
 
The Indian Congress Party … The intraparty politics resulting from its factionalism which  
they termed as an elaborative network of factions. The intraparty politics resulting from  
its factionalism ‘an inbuilt corrective’ which makes (the party) more representative,  
provides flexibility, and sustain internal competition, and which serves to make for mobility  
and leads to a fresh balance. The logic espoused from the argument is that leaders may be  
reluctant to take unpopular decisions for fear of igniting factions within their parties.  
 
It is particularly the case with the ANC taking into account the reluctance to oust underperforming 
cabinet Ministers with the concern that they might switch their allegiance to another faction. Mbeki 
was under severe pressure to relieve the National Police Commissioner Jackie Selebi of his duties after 
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it was alleged that he had participated in criminal activities. It happened at the time when Mbeki 
needed more support for his third-term campaign, and his critics pointed out that it was going to be 
very difficult for him expel his trusted confidante. Zuma is in the same predicament as he is expected 
to take a tough decision on the failure by the Department of Education to deliver textbooks to schools. 
The Minister responsible for the department is also president of the ANC Women’s League and Zuma 
cannot afford to falter with the minister because of political ambitions. Boucek (2009:468) notes that 
“factional objectives may contradict party objectives and may change over time in response to new 
contingencies (news issues, new leaders, new parties, etc.), which has implications for new group 
dynamics and factional cohesion. In addition, the degree to which factions become institutionalised 
may change overtime in response to new incentives (institutional changes, electoral reform, new party 
votes, etc.), which may produce new patterns of intra-party behaviour and change the direction of 
intra-party competition”. In the ANC case it simply means that the decision making processes have to 
be sensitive to the nature of factional tendencies and patterns that seem to punctuate the party. 
Boucek seems to reinforce the view that factions have the potential to undermine the party discipline, 
culture, and existing structures in political parties as it was the situation in the ANC during the 
leadership tussle between Mbeki and Zuma. The supporters of the incumbents that were contesting 
the presidency did not always play according to the rules of the party in terms of canvassing support 
for their preferred candidates.   
 
According to McAllister (1991:207) “organised factions thus permit a party to broaden its political 
appeal to win votes, while more successfully integrating a diversity of internal interests among the 
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party membership”. The implications of this statement are that while the term carries a negative 
connotation, it can be useful in the sense that it provides space for the alienated constituencies to 
influence the decision-making process as with the ANC candidature. The party that has vibrant internal 
democracy is likely to persuade potential members to join it. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
The main aim of this chapter was to provide a theoretical framework from which to examine 
factionalism as a political phenomenon. The development of factions that are taking place in the ANC 
requires a paradigm from which to understand the factors that contribute in the development of 
factions. While it is demonstrated in the discussions that parties that remain in power for a lengthy 
period tend to provide fertile ground for factions and competition among the party members to take 
place. The chapter pointed out the ANC as a political party that has held the reins for power is already 
showing signs of intra-party conflicts which are largely attributed to patronage and access to state 
resources for personal benefits. The literature surveyed points to the fact that though it is ‘pathology 
of politics’ factionalism it is not sufficiently covered by scholars.  
 
The recent work suggests that factions are triggered by a variety of factors in political parties, such as  
patronage and leadership squabbles. The dominant party systems tend to produce fertile grounds for  
factions and factionalism to grow, because of distribution of resources, tendency alignments and rally  
around charismatic leaders.  While the term is loaded with negative connotations, it has other ends  
such as broadening of the space for the marginalised to articulate their views on ideological matters  
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and leadership preferences. Indeed, the ANC, as a case study, has demonstrated that factionalism  
becomes inevitable the longer one stays in power. The next chapter provides a historical overview on 
the political circumstances at the Polokwane Conference of 2007. It explores key issues that shaped 
and influenced the political climate at the conference, such as the candidature of Mbeki and Zuma. 
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Chapter Three 
  
3.1 The 2007 ANC elective conference: The Road to Polokwane 
 
The Polokwane conference will remain an important subject for scholars concerned with the political 
developments of the ANC after 1994, precisely because of its impact on the organisation.  The coming 
together of the so-called the 2007 ANC elective conference was influenced by the open contest 
between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma for the presidency. What was the significance of the 52nd 
Congress in the history of the ANC besides the open contests for positions? Did the contests help the 
organisation in terms of entrenching democratic values in the ruling party? These questions will help to 
highlight the underlying circumstances that shaped the outcomes and proceeded to the elective 
conference that took place in Polokwane. The events leading to the conference will also help in terms 
of understanding democratic processes within the ANC and the Alliance, by extension. This chapter 
unpacks the contributing factors that contributed to the intensity of lobbying for leadership positions 
leading to the conference.  
 
The study assumes that besides the open contest for the presidency during the conference which was 
something uncommon in the life of the ANC, there was also a paradigm shift in terms of its traditions 
such as lobbying and the use of money to influence political decisions. It also deals with the extent to 
which the politics of HIV/AIDS impacted on the candidature at the conference. It examines closely the 
internal dynamics within the ANC and external factors influenced the policy direction of the ruling 
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party since its unbanning in the 1990s. By external dynamics the study refer to issues such as 
globalisation and its impact to the developing and Third World countries. The external dynamics in the 
ANC policy direction prevailed in its articulation of GEAR policy. Besides the intensity of lobbying prior 
to the conference for the support of candidates nominated to contest positions the state agencies such 
as the NIA became central in the ANC factions. The study takes cue from what is loosely referred to as 
sign posts to the 52nd Congress of the ANC to, draw a picture of circumstances and events leading to 
the elective conference in Polokwane.   
 
The ‘gathering storm’ metaphor employed by Fikeni (2009:3) aptly captures events leading to the 52nd 
Congress of the ANC. The elective conference has been described as a turning point in the history of 
the ANC in terms of the surfacing of new value systems that were generally foreign to the life of the 
ANC6. In addition, it is equally argued that the Polokwane conference exposed what was generally 
assumed to be a united organisation and broad church characterised by ideological contestations. It 
was a point where divisions started to articulate themselves and divisions in the society started to 
manifest themselves in a more political fashion7. Reddy (2010: 195) argues meticulously that 
“organizations that have been around for a long time and located in deeply divided societies are bound 
                                                          
6
 Interviewing Smuts Ngonyana 22/01/2012. He is currently Deputy President of the Congress of People (COPE) and former 
ANC spokesperson. He is alleged to have played a key role in the formation of COPE which formed immediately after the 
recall of Thabo Mbeki as the President of the Republic of South Africa.  
7
 Interviewing Deon Pretorius 07/04/2011. He is an independent consultant and former professor at the Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University and former political activist since 1980s. He also participated in the clandestine negotiations 
between the Broedebond and the ANC in exile. 
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to develop a factionalist character”. Mkhuseli Jack8 put it unambiguously as “the Polokwane ANC 
Conference can be regarded as a point at which the ANC as it was known up to that point took a turn 
to political anarchy. From there to now it has not been able to be steered back on track”. However, 
Janet Cherry9 took a more sophisticated line of argument regarding the importance of the 52nd 
Congress of the ANC by pointing out that “it was significant in terms of the internal politics of the ANC 
and the way in which the leadership was contested. It represented an expression of dissatisfaction with 
the leadership of Thabo Mbeki”.  
 
Despite several resolutions to be taken during the elective the mood and preparations for the 
conference were dominated by the factionalism caused by the contest between Mbeki and Zuma for 
ANC presidency. Reddy (2010:196) makes similar observations that “the battles for the ANC presidency 
between the third-term bid of Mbeki and Zuma before the Polokwane National Conference of the ANC 
in 2007 and the corruption scandal surrounding the role of then Deputy President Zuma and his 
financial advisor Schabir Shaik became the driving issues behind the emergence of brutal factional 
conflict, with each faction identified with the leading personality”. However, it remains to be discussed 
as to what extent the contest factions aligned between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma impacted on the 
unity of the organisation. The Polokwane Conference also introduced what is often referred to as 
‘slate’ or ‘block’ votes, meaning the practice of nominating candidates by different factions, and 
                                                          
8
 Interviewing Mkuseli Jack: 08/04/2011. Written response: It was an agreed arrangement after failing several times to 
secure an appointment with him. He is a businessman and former UDF / ANC activist and he defected to the Congress of 
the People. 
9
 Interviewing Janet Cherry. 12/12/2010: She teaches at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University and was a respected 
former UDF activist in the 1980s.  
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persons nominated by one faction will not be voted for by another, irrespective of the standing of that 
person in the organisation. It simply means if your name appears in one of the factions and that faction 
fails to lobby enough support for their preferred candidates, you will not be voted into an executive 
position and most probably not in the National Executive Committee. 
 
The main aim of this chapter is to provide a historical overview of the circumstances leading to the ANC 
Polokwane conference of 2007. Although National Congresses of the ANC are meant to reflect, elect 
leadership and adopt resolutions, the open contest between Zuma and Mbeki dominated the 
conference preparations10. The ousting of Zuma played itself out in the party politics rather than at 
government level, and it was used opportunistically by Mbeki’s political nemesis in the organisation to 
lobby support against him for his third term chances of leading the organisation (Chikane; 2012:136). It 
inevitable influenced discussions and lobbying for leadership preferences for the ANC presidency and 
the victimhood sentiments deployed by Zuma in the public domain strengthened his chances to lead 
the party. 
 
Arguably, the establishment of the Hefer Commission to investigate the allegations against the then 
Natational Director NPA Bulelani Ngcuka, that he was once investigated by the ANC intelligence as an 
apartheid spy suspect Browse Mole Report, Arms Deal Investigations and Hoax emails legend 
demonstrated the extent to which state security agencies were dragged into party politics. It points to 
what Reddy (2010:186) refers to as “conflation of party and institutions … political society becomes the 
                                                          
10
 This point was mentioned by Lerumo Kalako in our personal conversation about the Polokwane conference as he was one 
of the delegates. He pointed out that sharply that some delegates left the conference after the announcement of the 
leadership results because they felt that their contribution was limited at voting against Thabo Mbeki out of the presidency. 
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dominant political terrain and not civil society…”. Similarly, Gumede (2012:25) notes that “new terms 
of political engagement emerged in the battle for control of the ANC between Zuma and Mbeki. Both 
groups on occasion used upperhand means, whether selectively leaking confidential information, or 
using state institutions, such as intelligence agencies, to trip adversaries”. The Hefer Commission was 
part of the ANC leadership battles in the sense that the allegations were made to distract NPA from its 
work of conducting the investigations on corruption against corrupt politicians. As part of strategies by 
the Zuma camp to taint the alleged corruption case against him, it viewed the investigation as a 
political ploy aimed at preventing him from becoming the next president after Mbeki. In other words, 
the spy allegations against Bulelani Ngcuka were an attempt to tarnish the image not only of its leader, 
but of the organisation he was leading. In addition to other factors such as the perceived aloofness of 
Mbeki, the politics HIV/AIDS and ousting of Zuma as the deputy president helped to increase the 
momentum for support by Zuma’s campaigners. It is worth noting that the ANC policy conference of 
2005 served as a confidence-building mechanism for Zuma’s supporters because it allowed them to 
address the matter in the presence of constituencies that did not support his expulsion. More 
importantly, the matter was not on the agenda as it did not constitute a policy issue. But Zuma’s 
supporters successfully lobbied for the matter to be discussed in the conference and decisions taken 
were in their favour, such as allowing Zuma to continue with his political duties as the ANC deputy 
president.  
 Gumede (2005:309) observes that:  
 
At least one of Mbeki’s hopes could be dashed. Quite early into his second term of  
office the mood within the ANC was shifting towards a contested presidential election  
in keeping with the party’s established culture and tradition. Many believe that Mbeki’s 
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 uncontested rise to the position was a democratic aberration that should never happen again.  
 
The views by Gumede were expressed long before the lobbying for positions in the ANC reached a 
pinnacle. However, there were already discernable indications that the factionalism was taking place in 
the ruling party in an unprecedented way for the succession struggle. The dramatic events leading to 
the Polokwane conference do not necessarily point to the need to activate democratic processes 
within the organisation but to limit Mbeki’s third term as the ANC president. On the same note, 
Booysen (2011:39) argues that:  
…however, the position of ANC president had not been electorally determined by  
conferences. In contrast with Polokwane, contest for the top positions had largely been  
settled by leadership determination and consensus-seeking prior to elective conferences.  
The conferences then affirmed pre-determined new presidents, albeit with internal constituency 
mobilisation and affirmation...  
 
As a matter of fact, the nature of democracy practised by the political parties requires further close 
scrutiny in the sense that the mobilisation in their branches has nothing to do with encouraging rank 
and file members to exercise their right in electing leaders. In most cases, branches are manipulated to 
elect certain leaders, and difficult branches in terms of influencing them are always treated with 
disdain if not closed down or disbanded. The disruption of branch meetings by the members of the 
same organisation to demonstrate their discontent regarding internal democracy shows the 
manipulation of constituencies to vote for particular leaders during the conference.  Do ordinary 
members of the ANC influence the policy direction of the party? The following section deals with the 
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democratic processes within the ANC as a political party in government. The following section 
examines democracy within the ANC.        
                           
3.2 Democratic practices within the ANC and Alliance 
 
Political parties or liberation movements that have fought for democracy tend to lack internal 
democratic practices and openness that are needed in modern democracies (Lodge 1999; Booysen 
2011 ). The decision-making processes are often characterised by top-down and strait jacket 
approaches. Such approaches and practices have serious ramifications for internal democratic 
mechanisms as they limit space and scope for rank and file members to participate in the decision-
making processes. This chapter is concerned with the democratic practices within the ANC and 
Alliance. It looks at the extent to which the rank and file members participate in the decision-making 
process in the ANC and its elective processes. Most importantly, it considers to what extent decisions 
taken at government levels limit the participation of ANC structures to influence the policy direction. 
On the same note Lodge (1999:29) notes:  
 
policy making within the Tripartite Alliance was participatory and even democratic  
in the character up to the 1994 election. Since then, macro-economic policy making has  
become an increasingly circumscribed undertaking. The predisposition of individual  
ministers in the most important determinant of how widely the policy-making process. 
 
The argument by Lodge points to the failure by the leadership of the ANC to provide the grassroots 
supporters and Alliance partners with an opportunity to partake and influence the policy direction of 
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the ANC and the government, by extension. This was reflected in the manner in which the GEAR policy 
was formulated outside the structures of the ANC and the broader Alliance. Legassick (2007: 518) cites 
Mandela and Mbeki speeches to illustrate the tension caused by the adoption of GEAR that “…were 
even sharper to the 1998 SACP Congress. Hearing SACP leader Nqakula criticising the manifest failure 
of GEAR to meet most of its target; Mandela departed from his prepared text to say, “GEAR, as I have 
said before, is the fundamental of the ANC. We are not going to change that because of your criticism”.   
The stringent line of defence adopted by the ruling party has also had ramifications in terms of 
democratic practices in the organisation. It is unusual to find openness and democratic practices within 
liberation movements because of the manner in which they operate and how the power is structured 
within the organisation making extremely difficult for ordinary members to influence key political 
policy decisions and programmes of the organisation they belong to. The enforcement of discipline in 
the name of maintaining the party’s tradition to its members tend to produce intended or unintended 
consequences such as the stifling of space for the democratic way of doing things to put into practice. 
The application of discipline can result in the abuse of discretion so as to silence dissident voices in the 
organisation.  
 
The ANC, after it was banned by the apartheid government was forced to conduct its operations 
clandestinely. It became rooted and enmeshed in the culture of secrecy, which was characteristic of a 
liberation movement, liberation movements are marked by top-down decision-making processes 
(Maphai: 1994; Fikeni: 2009). In that culture it becomes difficult for ordinary members of the 
organisation to influence decisions, except to implement them. After its unbanning in 1990 and the 
1994 first democratic elections, the ANC continued to project itself as a liberation movement despite 
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the fact that it was a ruling party. This projection continued to put the grassroots supports on the 
sidelines in terms of influencing key policy decisions of the party and that of the government as a ruling 
organisation. The invoking of organisational culture when convenient can be very problematic for the 
practice of democracy in former liberation movements. Liberation movements by their nature operate 
on the basis of secrecy and rely on top-down approaches, such practices do not hug the requirements 
needed in modern democracies. Suffice it to say that the ANC as a former liberation struggle 
movement has not fully embraced the political party identity which would mean a significant shift in 
the manner in which it conducts its internal processes (Maphai: 1994).  The next paragraph examines 
the economic policy direction of the ANC.     
 
The economic policy direction followed by the ANC as a ruling party remains a contestant terrain in the 
Tripartite Alliance. It is marked by ideological skirmishes within the Alliance which are sparked by the 
economic policy direction that continue to take place after the Polokwane conference of 2007. The 
utterances made publicly on the economic policy development in the ANC by other Alliance partners 
show the level of growing frustration. Pallo Jordan11 (1997) argued in defense of the GEAR Policy that 
“the RDP was an attempt to reconcile our vision of transformation with what was immediately 
attainable in practice. The RDP has been further refined through the government’s GEAR strategy 
which is aimed at operationalising the RDP in the context of global environment within which South 
Africa has to live…” Jordan’s argument is crucial in the sense that the critics of the thrust of the GEAR 
                                                          
11
 Pallo Jordan is a respected Marxist historian and member of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC and National 
Working Committee (NWC). The views expressed by Jordan could have taken some members of the ANC by surprise given 
his lenient views of leftist and he is regarded as such by many both inside and outside the ANC.  
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policy failed to point out the global dynamics which South Africa could not escape in the policy-making 
arena.  It also notes the ANC awareness about the international terrain with respect policies and it is 
explained in the manner in which it discarded the Marxist language and rhetoric in its policies. 
 
On the same note, Macozoma (2003:13) has this to say: “The compromises made in the political 
settlement and limited role assigned to the state as a result of the impact of globalization, among other 
things, posed the first challenge to the tripartite alliance in relation to the transformation”.  As already 
demonstrated in Chapter 1 the GEAR economic policy in 1996 by the Nelson Mandela12 government 
remains one of the contested matters in the Tripartite Alliance it soured the relationship in the 
Alliance. Lodge (1999:6) notes that:  
 
Comparative experience in democratic political systems elsewhere suggests that despite 
 its historical commitment to people’s power in South Africa, the ruling party’s activist  
community will play a declining role in the political systems in which one party  
predominates for long periods tend to progressively limit the influence and the role  
played by the political party machine in decisive policy determination. 
 
The manner in which the ruling party introduced the GEAR policy without involving party structures 
seemed to suggest sidelining party members to determine the policy direction. The GEAR policy did not 
emanate from the ANC structures and alliance partners, but was taken at the government level.  
                                                          
12
 It is important to point out that although the policy was introduced during Mandela’s term and defended vigorously as 
non negotiable but it was strongly associated with Thabo Mbeki and remain as his legacy. Because of the internal politics 
and divisions in the Alliance there were glaring attempts to distance Mandela from the policy so as to cause more harm to 
Mbeki‘s prospects for leadership positions in the ANC.  
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Similarly, Alexander (2002) notes that: 
 
…On the other side, as it were, the ANC, like similar movements and organizations  
in the other Third World Countries, could no longer rely on the support of the Soviet  
for its military and training resources. As a result, the leverage in the Congress Alliance  
of the SACP generally and of its left wing in particular was reduced so that the  
moderates centrist elements in the leadership of the ANC could rapidly become  
decisive in the determination of policy and strategy.   
 
The views of Lodge and Alexander explain the practice which was creeping into the Tripartite Alliance 
and was obviously demonstrated in the manner in which GEAR policy was implemented without a 
comprehensive consultation. They also reveal the extent to which the exclusion of grassroots 
membership from contributing in important processes within the organisation was taking place. Marais 
(2011:367) comment that “in truth, the Alliance had suffered a succession of defeats on several fronts, 
very few of which could be attributed strictly to Mbeki’s hand. But the habit of personalising complex 
political dynamics was well established on the Alliance left and Mbeki had become its villain of choice”. 
Similarly, Jordan (Business Day: October 2012) notes that “for many in the ANC, Jacob Zuma’s election 
promised relief from the managed internal democracy of Mbeki’s incumbency”. In other words, the 
manner in which the ANC adopted the GEAR policy influenced the political climate and campaigns at 
the Polokwane conference for a new leadership that would be sensitive to the views of the grassroots 
members of the organisation. Mbeki was perceived as responsible for the systematic sidelining of party 
structures in participating and influencing the direction of the ANC.       
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The Alliance partners attributed the decline of internal democracy to the leadership style of Mbeki as 
the leader of both the ANC and government. Fikeni (2009:7-8) asserts that “his leadership style and 
alienation of ANC senior leaders, as well as the general failures of government, came under spotlight 
and were the rallying cry and call to war for the ANC and alliance cadres who were mobilising for new 
leadership under Zuma”. The point here is to demonstrate as to how policy path followed by the ruling 
party impacted on the Tripartite Alliance and its implications for the democratic practices in the 
organisation.   
 
This section has sought to illustrate how these practices brought about dissatisfaction in the rank and 
file members of the organisation and influenced the outcomes of the Polokwane Conference. As 
already indicated the Road to Polokwane was not short of drama and the accusations against Bulelani 
Ngcuka that the ANC had investigated him during the 1980’s to establish whether he was an apartheid 
spy was a case in point. The story of Bulelani Ngcuka was carried by the City Press newspaper under 
the heading ‘Was Ngcuka a spy?’ (The Hefer Commission of Enquiry)13 . The next section will attempt 
to unpack the nature of allegations against Bulelani Ngcuka within the context of leadership struggles 
in the ANC. 
3.3 The Hefer Commission 
 
The commission that was established to verify the allegations against Ngcuka provides an angle from 
which to consider how the state machinery was brought into play as a way to deal with party politics 
                                                          
13
 The Hefer Commission of Enquiry was appointed by the President Thabo Mbeki in 2003 to determine the veracity of the 
allegations against Bulelani Ngcuka.  
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matters.  The study demonstrates that the allegations leveled against Ngcuka by Zuma’s supporters in 
the organisation were part the tactics aimed at weakening the institution he led and that was 
responsible for charging Jacob Zuma. 
 
Allegations of surfaced through the media that Bulelani Ngcuka had once been investigated by the ANC 
intelligence as a spy suspect, they came at the time that he was heading the National Prosecution 
Authority as its national director. Interestingly, the allegations came to the public at the time that the 
NPA was conducting investigations of corruption against Schabir Shaik, the former financial adviser of 
Jacob Zuma. The charges against Schabir Shaik related to the soliciting of a bribe from the company 
that was bidding on behalf of Zuma in the arms deal. Zuma was later relieved of his duties as deputy 
president of the country, and later charged with corruption. The aim here is not to deal with the merits 
of the charges, but to illustrate how the investigation into Zuma by the NPA became entangled in the 
party politics of the ANC.  
 
The timing of the investigations raised more questions than answers. Zuma’s supporters used the case 
opportunistically to argue that the prosecution against him was part of the ploy to prevent him from 
leading the ANC and the country as well. The statement made by Bulelani Ngcuka that there was prima 
facie evidence of Zuma’s involvement in corrupt activities with Shaik. They had decided not to try him 
as there was no guarantee of winning the case against him (Fikeni; 2009: 7). The assertion from the 
NPA further fuelled the suspicions, and was perceived as an attempt to cause political damage to Jacob 
Zuma. Gumede (2005:303) notes that: “restless smear campaign against Ngcuka threatened at one 
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point to bring down the Scorpinions, long considered the country’s most effective law enforcement 
agency”. In fact, this provided Zuma’s supporters with ammunition to perceive the allegations in 
political terms, taking into account the fact that Mbeki was perceived as using state resources in 
settling political scores. 
 
Mbeki stood accused by members of the ANC for using state agencies to deal with his political enemies 
and the charges against Zuma were interpreted in that light. The NPA involvement fed into the 
suspicions that he was using state agencies against his political adversaries. The internal dynamics of 
the ANC played out sharply in the public domain as a result of the charges that were levelled against 
Jacob Zuma, considered by his supporters to be a natural successor of Thabo Mbeki. Zuma used the 
court appearances to trump up support for the leadership position which was evidenced by the large 
numbers that came to listen to his speeches. In all speeches he delivered in his supporters he 
consistently maintained his innocence and accused his political opponents in the ANC of trying to deny 
his chances to lead the organisation. As the support against Mbeki’s third term for the ANC presidency 
was growing Zuma’s case was used to help his cause of escaping the charges and becoming president 
of the ANC after Polokwane conference. On the same note, Booysen (2011:363) has this to say: 
“Portraying himself as a fall guy, Zuma turned the drama inside out. Instead of fading from the scene as 
a shamed ANC veteran accused of pocketing backhanders from arms dealers, Zuma would be 
transformed into an embodiment of political virtue and ANC tradition, hounded by a conniving 
comrade-turned villain, Thabo Mbeki”. The politicisation of corruption charges against Zuma revealed 
the extent to which the line between the state and the ruling party was easily blurred by both factions 
for political expedience. Despite the fact that it was abundantly clear that Zuma had a case to answer 
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in the court of law regarding the charges that were leveled against him but state agencies were drawn 
into the matter to weaken the case against him such as NIA. 
 
It is worth citing Booysen (2011:369) to illustrate the point that “few institutions escaped the ANC’s 
civil war of the time. Intense new politicisation of the state apparatus resulted, along with the 
institutionalisation of the internal ANC contestation at a high and distracting-destructive level”.   It is 
worth noting that Zuma did not struggle to find an audience as the dissatisfaction with the leadership 
style of Mbeki was brewing and fermenting. Feinstein (2007:290) states approvingly that: “By creating 
so many enemies within the ANC, Mbeki handed Zuma a constituency of the abused. This desperate 
group, united only by their desire to get rid of Mbeki…”. The argument by Feinstein seems to show the 
failure by scholars engaged with the pre-Polokwane political landscape to reveal the fact that some of 
the people who opportunistically associated themselves with Zuma’s cause were not victimised by 
Mbeki but simply in trouble with the law, but portrayed themselves as victims. Tony Yengeni14 served a 
prison term after he failed to disclose in parliament the discount he received when he purchased a 4X4 
vehicle. After serving his term in prison, he became a supporter of Zuma, and portrayed himself as a 
victim.  
 
The ability of Jacob Zuma to attract the left of the Alliance is something that requires more 
investigation or needs much analysis about the meaning of the left in the South African political 
                                                          
14
 Tony Yengeni is the member of the ANC National Executive Committee (NEC) and former Member of Parliament and 
chairperson of the Defence Portfolio Committee. 
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discourse. Legassick (2007: 536) notes that: “the claim that Zuma is friendly to the workers is simply 
not correct…Zuma does not represent the left within the ANC alliance”.  
 
The ability of Zuma to appease the Alliance Leftist emanates from the tendency to equate charisma 
and populism with the left as a perspective. The analysis by Legassick provides a sound explanation as 
to why he managed to pull together unlike charges to advance his cause against Thabo Mbeki. In all 
these political manouvres, the state agencies were drawn into the ANC and Alliance politics to weaken 
each faction. The Browse Mole Report, the Hoax Email Saga and other unsanctioned spying, amount to 
an abuse of state machinery to advance party politics interests. In fact, all factions involved had a 
blame to share in the abuse of state agencies for political ends. For instance, the hoax email saga 
evinced deep divisions in the ANC and willingness to resort to state machinery to dent potential 
competitors for political power. The following paragraph examines the degree to which state 
machinery was used in furtherance of factionalism caused by the leadership tussle in the ruling party. 
 
The utilisation of state agencies by the ANC to deal with its internal political matters exposed the 
extent to which the state agencies were embedded in the dirty war that was taking place in the ANC 
prior and post-Polokwane. According Owen (Financial Mail, May 22 2009) states that “the Zuma-Mbeki 
feud has given us glimpses of how the game is played, with the intelligence agencies employed to spy 
on rivals, with the manufacture and dissemination of false e-mails, malicious leaks and scurrilous 
rumours”. Furthermore, the situation also exposed the ruling party failure to rely on its mechanisms 
and processes to deal with its own internal affairs as a ruling party. In addition, the Browse Mole 
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Report provides an opening from which to view the manner in which the state machinery was pulled 
into party politics to advance factional interests at the ANC 52nd Congress of 2007 that took place in 
Polokwane.  
 
The recent book by Chikane15 (2012:187) provides a detailed account of the developments leading to 
Polokwane and after the conference he argues that “the Browse Mole Report, a top-secret produced 
by elements within the DSO16, which claimed that Jacob Zuma was involved in a conspiracy to topple 
President Thabo Mbeki’s government”. The book provides an account of the presidency after Mbeki 
resigned but also deals with the ANC divisions that resulted in the recall of Mbeki.  This section 
demonstrates how the state apparatus such as intelligence agencies was pulled into the ANC 
leadership jostle for positions, and how the line between the state and party was blurred in order to 
advance party political matters and dynamics within the ruling party. Without doubt these acts tilted 
the political landscape in favour of Jacob Zuma’s ambition to lead the ANC after the Polokwane 
conference. Barney Mthombothi17 (Financial Mail; May 15 2009) in his attempts to deconstruct the 
road to the Zuma presidency argues convincingly that “Zuma’s strong selling point was that he wasn’t 
Thabo Mbeki. Many party delegates who were not too enthusiastic about Zuma voted for him just to 
prevent Mbeki from hanging on to power”. This opinion by Mthombothi is also reinforced by Friedman 
                                                          
15
 The book by Frank Chikane, former director-general, in the office of presidency is the latest publication on the post-
Polokwane political landscape and its critiques questioned the timing of the publication as it provides a detail account of 
the circumstances on the removal of Thabo Mbeki as the president of the Republic of South Africa.  
16
 DSO is the abbreviation which stands for Directorate of Special Operations which is a sub-division of the National 
Prosecutions Authority (NPA) 
17
 Barney Mthombothi is the chief editor of the Financial Mail 
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(The Thinker; Volume 10 2009) that “Polokwane elected a desperate united only by a desire to see 
Mbeki leave office” The next section discusses and dissects as to how the views of Thabo Mbeki on 
HIV/AIDS were used to thwart his third term chances of leading the ANC. 
 
The spread of HIV/AIDS18 in South Africa presented a major challenge for the post-apartheid 
government in terms of curbing the scourge it was causing in the population, especially in the poverty-
stricken areas. It was Mbeki’s views on the causal factors angered many people including members of 
his political organisation because he was entering into the science of the epidemic, which was not his 
terrain. The level of frustration from the civil society, opposition parties and within the Tripartite 
Alliance prevented the broader community from seeing the brighter side of his arguments when he 
questioned the dumping of medicines whose efficacy was questionable in dealing with the spread of 
the epidemic. He questioned the efficacy of the medication and the price, and his line of argument was 
taken as unwillingness to address the epidemic. It was also said that pharmaceutical companies were 
only concerned with accruing profits, taking into account the fees imposed.  Chikane (2012:221) notes 
that “Mbeki’s position on this matter proved to be the most controversial in his career and generated 
the most vicious campaign against him and his Minister of Health. To some, especially those who were 
affected by HIV and AIDS, it made Mbeki look cold and uncaring” He attracted all manner of criticism 
from a broad range of formations, individuals and institutions dedicated to the fight to curb the spread 
                                                          
18
 It is worth noting that the HIV/AIDS is not part of this research question but is something worth highlighting as it became 
a key issue during the leadership race before Polokwane. It was resuscitated to disqualify and minimise Mbeki’s chances 
leading the ANC for a third term. Interestingly not surprisingly, the views expressed by Zuma during the rape trials which 
could have disqualified him given the government struggle in curbing the endemic. The public outcry about his crude grasp 
within the ANC and outside did not cause any damages to his chances as he was elected as the leader of the party, 
notwithstanding.   
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of the disease. It added to a host of other factors that were used to weaken him politically. It is a 
matter that refused to die even beyond the Polokwane Conference. 
 
Roberts (2007:186) argues in defence of Mbeki’s stance that “Mbeki’s refusal to play stenographer to 
the drug companies in the management of South Africa’s major public health issue apparently meant 
that Mbeki was a ‘denialist ‘or ‘AIDS dissident’” The focus of the study is on the impact caused by 
HIV/AIDS but it explains the extent to which the epidemic was used against him by his political 
opponents outside and inside his ruling party. Interestingly, impatience grew up even outside the ANC, 
and this was amply demonstrated by civil society groups such as the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) 
which fought raucously for the introduction of antiretroviral drugs for HIV/AIDS patients. Marais 
(2011:279) contends that:  
…supported by COSATU and church organisation and spearheaded by the Treatment Action  
Campaign (TAC) AIDS activists challenged health-service providers, government and pharmaceutical  
companies to do more to bring AIDS treatment to the poor people…AIDS lobby groups challenged  
government in court for failing to uphold the health rights enshrined in the constitution.  
 
The politics of the HIV/AIDS endemic were used against Mbeki at the Polokwane Conference, and the 
failure of the South African government intervention to resolve the Zimbabwe political impasse was 
also invoked so as to cast aspersion and taint Mbeki’s legacy. Mbeki attracted a lot of criticism by 
drawing from unorthodox scientists views in engaging on HIV/HIV discourse and his stance did not go 
well even with the members of the ANC. The focus of this section has been on the politics of HIV/AIDS 
and the extent to which it impacted on the candidature for the leadership contest in the ANC at the 
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Polokwane elective conference of 2007. The next section attempts unravel how the mission by Mbeki 
to transform the ANC into a modern political party backfired and impacted on his race to secure the 
third term of the ANC presidency.    
 
The attempts to transform the ANC into a modern political party had serious implications for the 
decision-making process in the Tripartite Alliance and ordinary members became spectators in the 
process. In fact, the factional tendencies encountered by the ANC before its National Conference in 
2007 could be partly attributed to the changes introduced into the ANC, and the policy shifts made. 
The implementation of GEAR as a policy without comprehensive consultation raised critical questions 
about the location of power within the Tripartite Alliance. Part of the problem regarding GEAR is that it 
was not conceptualised and developed in the realm of the ANC grassroots structures, and this further 
exemplified the disjuncture between the leadership and the constituencies. Mbeki’s critics inside and 
outside the ANC pointed out that the decision to implement GEAR without comprehensive 
consultation of other members, presented a sharp shift from ANC traditional practice. Similarly, 
Gumede (2009: 35) noted that: 
 
The transformation of the ANC under Mbeki led to the adoption of new values, goals and strategies.  
 
These have serious implications for the way in which the ANC operates, the way in which and  
 
authority vis-à-vis the leadership and membership are exercised, and the ANC’s relations with its 
 
 alliance partners. Ideologically, this has meant moving the ANC firmly to the political centre.  
 
As Gumede correctly observes the changes introduced in the ANC produced unintended consequences 
such as sidelining of the organisation’s structures to partake in important decisions. In some instances 
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the notion of providing leadership which is often described as democratic centralism, played a role in 
eroding the culture of the ANC. ‘The provision of leadership’ refers to the taking of decisions on behalf 
of ordinary members, which undermines the consultation process. These practices stood in sharp 
contrast to the tradition and culture of the ANC. On the same issue, Lodge (1999: 6) argues that 
“…these developments, together with the growing reliance of government and corporatist decision-
making institutions, have tended to rob parties of any significant role in policy formulation”. The above 
discussed issues point to the fact that the top-down approaches relied on in dealing with the party 
political matters during Mbeki’s terms in office had an adverse effect on his third term campaign.   
 
3.4 Conclusion 
 
The growth and national electoral success of the ANC after 1994 exposed the ruling party to other 
mechanisations such as drawing the state agencies in terms of dealing with the internal matters of the 
organisation. The road to the ANC Polokwane conference demonstrates quite clearly the degree to 
which factions of the ruling party reliance state intelligence gathering instruments to weaken each 
other.   The main aim of this chapter was to analyse and unpack the political contours leading to the 
ANC Elective Congress of 2007 and the extent to which they influenced the mood, and shaped the 
leadership contest. Furthermore, it scrutinised as to how the notion of two centres of power was 
employed by the factions canvassing for Zuma thwarted Mbeki’s chances in the leadership contest. 
More importantly, it discussed the manner in which the state agencies such as NIA were dragged into 
the intraparty conflict to outcompete each other. The chapter argued that the manner in state 
apparatus were used in the party politics affairs blurred the line between the state and the ruling 
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organisation. The Bulelani Ngcuka case which led to the appointment of a Commission to determine 
the veracity of the accusations against him, provided a case from which to locate as to how state 
agencies were abused for internal party issues. For instance, the weakening of Ngcuka by his 
opponents meant, by extension, would probably have the same impact on Mbeki, taking into account 
the issues that were play at that time. 
 
What also came out sharply from the chapter is the fact that the policy-making process in the ANC and 
Alliance became a terrain for contestation. The adoption of GEAR as discussed in detail in the previous 
chapter had serious implications for internal democracy within the Alliance and the participation of 
ANC structures to influence the policy direction of the party. The attempts to modernise the ANC was 
one of the issues that were used against Thabo Mbeki as it was felt that his leadership style was 
responsible for the challenges facing the ANC such factionalism.    
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Chapter 4 
 
                               
                                   Two Centres of Power and its Implications for Service Delivery 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Political infighting in the ANC impacts on governance structures and the local municipality level. This 
study seeks to demonstrate the effects of the 2007 power contestations between Zuma and Mbeki on 
the NMBM. The study demonstrates that power struggles in the ruling party blurred the lines between 
the state and the political party in power. Furthermore, it shows how the centres of power dynamics in 
the ANC manifested themselves in the organisation and to the state institutions such as local 
government. The next paragraph unravels how the two centres of power impacted on the candidature 
of Mbeki and Zuma contest for the ANC presidency. 
 
 
The use of the phrase ‘two centres of power’ took a hold during the ANC leadership contest at the 
elective conference of 2007. This jargon featured not only in the South Africa’s political discourse but 
also became ensnared in the body politic. The candidature of Mbeki for a third term did not have 
implications for the ANC elective processes, since the constitution of the party does not limit terms for 
the presidency. In order to create stumble blocks for Mbeki’s attempt to secure his third term 
presidency, his political opponents introduced the lexicon of two centres of power in the succession 
debate to reduce Mbeki’s chances for the presidential contest. It was the ANC Youth League under the 
stewardship of Fikile Mbalula that used the two centres of power language to express its opposition to 
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Mbeki’s third term bid for the ANC presidency The use or the coining of the ‘centres of power’ phrase 
was designed first and foremost to prevent Thabo Mbeki’s third term as the president of the ANC.  
 
Booysen (2011:463) argues persuasively that “the dual centres of power discourse at the time of 
Mbeki-Zuma succession struggle served as a substitute for direct attacks on the incumbent (Mbeki), 
and both centres and the personal attacks were often anchored in policy”. At times, Mbeki’s political 
adversaries resorted to direct personal attacks referring to his aloofness, his intellect, and how he had 
previously dealt with people who differed with him politically or has potential to frustrate his 
leadership prospects in the ANC. The study discusses the two centres of power in the context of 
standing for the presidency between Zuma and Mbeki in particular. However, the study also examines 
the implications of the notion of centres of power in the NMBM as a local sphere of government. 
Equally important, the study will also unpack the meaning of the centres of power in relation to the 
party and the state   
 
The debate on the centres of power was limited to national politics and did not address the 
implications for the provincial and local government spheres.  For the purposes of keeping debates 
within manageable units, an attempt will be made to discuss how the politics of centres of power 
permeated the NMBM. It has already been highlighted that the conceptualisation of two centres of 
power was brought into play as a strategy to enfeeble Mbeki’s chances to lead the ANC for a third 
term. It will also look at how the notion of two centres of power was implemented and negotiated in 
the NMBM. 
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The concept of the two centres of power, which became a mantra in the South Africa’s body politic at 
the 52nd Congress of the ANC was a convenient strategy for the political nemesis of Thabo Mbeki, to 
frustrate his chances of leading the ANC for a third term. Its usage and application were not limited to 
the leadership tussle, but also revealed how the ruling the party defined its relationship with the state.  
Booysen (2011:365) observes that:  
 
The debate on the ‘two centres of power’ dominated ANC and Alliance discourse about the  
 
articulation between party and state. It was used in the context of the right of the ANC to 
 
 make appointments of its choice, including to the highest office in the land, through its policy  
 
of cadre deployment and operations of its national and provincial deployment committees.  
 
It often focused on whether the ANC president and senior NEC members would be deployed in  
 
the political national and provincial government executive of the country. It was increasingly  
 
regarded as a pre-condition for the smooth of the government to have a consolidated, single  
 
centre of power – with the party as the centres (and the ANC leg of the Alliance signifying this  
 
‘party’) …The two-centres came to haunt the ANC when the gender quotas for the top-level  
 
appointments – with the premiers as to example – failed to articulate with women’s seniority  
 
in the ANC provincial hierarchies.  
 
 
The articulation and conceptualisation of the centres of power was steeped in factional politics, and 
mainly at the national leadership level. The political developments both at provincial and local 
government levels represent the failure to think through how it was going be put into practice. The 
appointment of premiers in provinces where the party is in control who are not necessarily at the helm 
of the party as chairpersons points to inconsistencies in terms of implementation of the concept. The 
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same can be said regarding mayors at the local government level. This chapter seeks to explore how 
the notion of two centres of power manifested itself, implemented or negotiated at the NMBM. The 
politics of the centres of power in the NMBM was informed by the local dynamics in the ANC and the 
development of Stalini and Stepping Stones factions. The development of the two factions came across 
as the drawing of a line between the supporters of Zuma and those of Mbeki. 
 
The political tension between the ‘Stalini and Stepping Stones’19 presents a case in which to examine 
how the centres of power dynamics manifested themselves in the city as they contested for a political 
space. The study will outline the underlying circumstances behind the divisions between the 
contending groups. The Mbeki-Zuma divide which was caused by the ANC leadership contest before its 
52nd Congress manifested in the NMBM through the Stalini-Stepping Stone factions. The next section 
will attempt to provide some perspectives and insights into what was referred to as Stepping Stones – 
Stalini divide, which can be explained as a demarcation of factions between groups that were 
contending for a political space in the NMBM. The study will also decipher the political significance of 
the names attached to the factions. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Both factions names were derived from the respective venues where they held their meetings. 
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4.2 Stepping Stones - Stalini divide 
 
The development of Stepping Stones and Stalin faction in the NMBM served as a differentiation 
between the supporters of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma. In the region Mike Xego20 and Nceba Faku21 
became faces of these respective contending groups in backing their preferred candidates nominated 
for the ANC national elective congress that was going to take place in Polokwane. On the surface the 
names of the contending groups seemed to have a political significance. However, these names 
assumed no political worth or ideological meaning. The names attached to these competing factions 
came from the respective venues where they held meetings. Stepping Stones is the name of a building 
in the Northern Areas22 while Stalini is a hall in Zwide Township, and this view was also expressed by 
Jack (The Herald November 12, 2007)   
 
Stepping Stones was canvassing for Thabo Mbeki for the presidency while Stalini was supporting Jacob 
Zuma. It is worth noting that the Stalini – Stepping Stones divide also served to highlight the balance of 
forces in the city prior the National Conference. It was through the contestations between these two 
groups that people were able to ascertain how branches were going to vote in the National 
Conference.  Both factions tested their influence and strategies at branch level because that was where 
                                                          
20
 Mike Xego was a staunch supporter of Thabo Mbeki for the third term and his ANC Regional Executive Committee (REC) 
which was later disbanded because of alleged irregularities in the conference that elected them (The Herald April 30, 2008). 
He later defected to the Congress of the People (COPE) which was formed by supporters of Thabo Mbeki after he was 
recalled as the President of the Republic of South Africa. However, he rejoined the ANC after leadership squabbles in COPE. 
21
 Interviewing Nceba Faku 10/02/2011.  ANC Regional Executive Committee (REC) in the NMBM. 
22
 In the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality Coloured areas are historical referred as Northern Areas. It is a reflection of 
apartheid government spatial zoning of locations along the colour lines.  
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it mattered most in terms of the support. Factions by their nature have no formal status and operate 
covertly.  Members of these groups and their followers are allowed to switch loyalty depending on the 
prevailing circumstances and prospects that come with remaining and changing of allegiance. That is 
why suspicions, accusations and counter accusations become ubiquitous, and the same can be said 
with regard to the character these factions assumed.  
 
Interestingly, while it is illustrated in the previous sections that there were no ideological differences 
between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma factions canvassing for them emphasised their different 
leadership styles so as to reach the status of ideology23. Booysen (2011:69) notes that, “there was no 
simple policy or ideological divide…there was lots of anger, and unresolved issues…the divide was 
about the personal loyalties”. The fact mentioned by Booysen that some people indicated there were 
prepared to kill for their preferred candidate was a clear indication of the extreme form of this loyalty. 
An editorial letter penned by Bhanga24 (The Herald June 23, 2008) points to the fact that “people are 
grouped on the basis of different preferences in leadership and the opportunists abused these 
preferences of ANC members to divide our comrades”.  On the same note, Janet Cherry25 argues that 
“Jacob Zuma has got same background as Thabo Mbeki… Obviously Thabo Mbeki is an intellectual but 
they both have been through the same ideological background and at some stage they have been close 
to the Communist Party and what would be called left position and both nationalist…”. The argument 
                                                          
23
 Interviewing Monde Mtanga 27/11/2010.  Former ANC member and supporter of Thabo Mbeki. He joined the Congress 
of the People (COPE). 
24
 Bhanga was an ANC political activist who later joined COPE to become a great critique of the ruling party in the NMBM. 
25
 Interviewing Janet Cherry 12/12/2010. 
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by Cherry substantiates the fact that there were no ideological differences between Zuma and Mbeki, 
but their supporters overstressed what was perceived to be ideological difference to go forward with 
their interests. It seems that the charisma of Zuma and his chameleon style of changing his views 
regardless played an important role in terms of bolstering his campaign for the presidency.  
 
 
In addition, the stand-offs between the contending groups in the city which took the form of political 
theatres highlighted the levels of tension. The disruption of council meetings by the ANC councillors 
and those that were taking place in the ANC regional offices known as Standard House were common 
scenes. It is alleged that these protestations were led mainly by the disenchanted ANC councillors 
whose protests led to the disbanding of the ANC regional executive committee under Mike Xego: 
Mphande, H; Witson, G and Jack, M (The Herald June 10, 2008). The matter that was at centre stage 
between these fragments was the legitimacy of the Regional Executive Committee (REC) led by Mike 
Xego: Mphande, H; Witson; G and Jack, M (The Herald June 10, 2008). It is worth noting that the 
disbandment of the ANC REC by the National Executive Committee took place a few months down the 
line after the Polokwane national elective conference. The plan to disband the Committee signified an 
attempt by Zuma camp to strengthen its power in the city after the Polokwane Conference. 
 
It became evident that the supporters of Jacob Zuma wanted leadership change so as to exercise their 
influence, as the incumbents associated with Thabo Mbeki were still in control of the city and 
resources, by extension. Booysen (2011: 34) observes that “in fact, the post-Polokwane ANC was 
intensely contradicted by the co-existence of the old and the new”. The observations by Booysen offer 
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insight in terms of understanding the character of the political dynamics and infighting in the NMBM 
which were primarily precipitated by the post-Polokwane political landscape to control the city. The 
supporters of Zuma legitimised their action of rooting out anything that spanked Mbeki on the 
suspicion that they might frustrate the resolutions taken in the Polokwane conference. In a radio 
interview before the Polokwane conference Thabo Mbeki sharply questioned the logic of two centres 
of power he contended that “it is the ANC that makes policy and the programme and polices followed 
by the government have been those of the ANC” (The Herald December 10, 2007). Nceba Faku26 put it 
brusquely that “there is only one centre, which is the ANC”.     
 
The decision to disband the REC in the NMBM was also part of other broader forms of struggle within 
the ruling party. The leadership contests in the ANC as the ruling organisation strikingly spilled into the 
state. It suffices to say that the state also became a contestant terrain so as to create fertile ground for 
the institutionalisation of patronage by the ruling elite. By the same token, it also meant any position in 
the party was a step closer to the state resources27. Likewise, Booysen (2011: 33-34) states that “the 
ANC-Polokwane events that paralysed so much of state operation for an extended period thus help us 
to understand both past and the future of the ANC. Fusion between state and party meant that the 
state was and remained an arena for ANC contests”.  
 
                                                          
26
 Interviewing Nceba Faku 10/02/2011 
27
 Interviewing Zolile Siswana 14/11/2010. Executive Director for Economic Development and Recreational Services at 
NMBM. 
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Notwithstanding the impact caused by the contests for power in the city there was some kind of sense 
in the strategy by the Zuma camp to seek a shift in the balance of power, taking into account the 
nature of contradictions and mistrust in the region caused by the tensions along factional lines.  
The Stalini-Stepping Stone political theatre came to an end after the establishment of the COPE. 
However, the disappearance of the Stepping Stones faction from the political scene did not translate 
into an automatic end of political tensions in the city. It will be demonstrated in the study that the 
nature of tensions that continue to manifest in the NMBM borders on the centres of power. The 
ongoing tension between the Mayor and ANC REC seems to highlight disjuncture between the City Hall 
and Standard House. It raises more questions about the location of power in the Metro taking into 
account the multiplicity of the centres of power which is a post-Polokwane political syndrome.  These 
issues will be considered in the subsequent sections in a more detailed fashion. It is worth noting that 
the disbandment of the ANC REC under the stewardship of Mike Xego brought a shift in terms of terms 
of political control in the Metro. The next section will attempt to look at the nature of the balance of 
power in the Metro.  
 
 
4.3 The Balance of Power 
 
 
Immediately after the installation of the new REC rumours about the mayoral reshuffling started to 
make the rounds. At that time Nondumiso Maphazi28 was the Executive Mayor of the NMBM. It was 
not surprising taking into account that there were already political casualties, guilty by association or 
                                                          
28
 Nondumiso Maphazi was the 2
nd
 Mayor of the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality (NMBM) after the post political 
dispensation and she succeeded Nceba Faku. She was appointed by Thabo Mbeki, then, President of the Republic of South 
Africa.   
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suspected to belong to the Mbeki camp such as Nosimo Mbalindlela29. Her ousting as a Premier of 
Eastern Cape was caused by her support of Thabo Mbeki’s bid for a third term as the party president. 
In other words, this created a sense of precedence, and sparked speculations about removing people 
chosen during Thabo Mbeki’s tenure or appeared to be close to him.  
 
Nondumiso Maphazi was not a political heavyweight in the region or political astute, and as a result 
she lacked the authority needed30 in the position she occupied. The incumbents serving on such 
positions cannot only depend on constitutional powers bestowed to perform their duties as was the 
case with Maphazi and she needed constituency to insulate her from other pressure groups within the 
ruling party.  As a mayor, she could not implement crucial decisions as she was consistently 
undermined by the officials in the institution who happened to be senior to her in the ruling party, but 
her removal was tardy owing to the fact that the ANC Provincial Executive Committee (PEC) was 
reportedly to be close to Thabo Mbeki and to his appointees. The wish to undermine her as the mayor 
of the city could be attributed to her low ranking in the party hierarchy.  This tendency was bound to 
happen when the senior political activists were deployed in the same state apparatus. This produced a 
paradox situation in the sense that she had to account to the junior officials in the ANC meetings. It 
made her a lame duck as the mayor of the city. It is worth noting that the tendency by the political 
                                                          
29
 Nosimo Balindlela was the Premier of the Eastern Cape Province that was recalled after the Polokwane conference. 
30
 Interviewing Mthiwabo Ndube 29/09/2011. He served in the ANC Regional Executive Committee (REC) that was dissolved 
after the Polokwane Conference and deflected to the Congress of the People (COPE) and rejoined the ANC. 
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activists serving as officials exposed the failure to parley their roles in the government institutions, as 
was the case at the NMBM during Maphazi’s term of office31.  
 
The tendency to undermine Maphazi further annotates the blurring of the line wilfully or unconsciously 
between the state and the ruling party. It is alleged that officials aligned to the factions failed to appear 
in the meetings scheduled to discuss important issues, and as a result service delivery in the Metro was 
seriously affected by the political infighting32. This point to the failure to separate administration and 
politics. This matter will be picked up and developed later in the discussions. It looked as if her stay in 
the office as a mayor increased tensions further in the ANC, taking into account disruption of council 
meetings by her political opponents in the ANC.  It also made obvious the impatience that was growing 
among the supporters of Zuma prior the conference. The post-Polokwane rumblings in the region were 
by and large fuelled by the need to accommodate the Stalini group: Bhanga (The Herald June 23, 
2008).  
 
On the other side, Nceba Faku33 countered the allegations by arguing that her removal had nothing to 
do with the purging of comrades appointed by Thabo Mbeki but influenced by issues connected to 
service delivery. His argument was that the removal of Maphazi was based on their assessment of her 
performance as the executive mayor. It was the responsibility of the ANC to continuously assess its 
                                                          
31
 Interviewing Zolile Siswana 14/11/2010 
32
 Interviewing Schalk Potgieter 30/03/2011. He is an Assistant Director: Strategic Planning and Convener: NMBM Multi-
Disciplinary Task Team. Human Settlement Directorate. 
33
 Interviewing Nceba Faku: ANC Regional Chairman 10/02/2011. 
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deployees. The argument advanced by Nceba Faku to give reasons for the decision to remove Maphazi 
from the mayoral position was completely not compelling taking into account subsequent 
developments such as deployment of Nondumiso Maphazi to the highest office in the province as an 
advisor to the office of the Eastern Cape Premier. It does not make sense to remove someone from a 
position on the basis of failing to deliver, but place the very same person in a higher structure.  
 
 
In fact, the decision to remove Maphazi from the mayoral position lent credence to the suspicion that 
it was time to create space for the Stalini group or payback time for the supporters of Zuma. In fact, if 
her removal was caused by the lack of service delivery in the city the ruling party could easily have 
been accused of rewarding failure. It was crystal clear that there were other considerations influencing 
the decision to oust her.    
 
The political infighting in the region between the Stalini and Stepping Stone factions was brought to an 
end by the formation of COPE which was formed instantaneously after the recall of Thabo Mbeki as the 
President of the Republic of South Africa. It is supposed that it brought a sense of stability in the ANC 
because large number of supporters of Mbeki who belonged to the Stepping Stones joined the new 
formation. Nceba Faku34 put it candidly that “that group is no longer there now, and there is stability in 
the ANC, but no organisation can claim not to have challenges”. But what was conspicuously missing in 
his views about the state of affairs in the organisation was the fissure between the City Hall and 
Standard House that assumed a new form of factionalism in the Metro.  
                                                          
34
 Interviewing Nceba Faku 10/02/2011 
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The reason for using names of places in this instance to mark the nature of tension in the city is to 
avoid the temptation of simply reducing the institutional differences to personalities. A few months 
down the line after the installation of the new Executive Mayor in the NMBM, simmering tensions 
emerged between the ANC Regional Executive Committee35 and Mayoral Committee (City Hall). The 
next section seeks to unbundle the nature and causes of the tensions between the City Hall and 
Standard House. It will scrutinise the causal factors with respect to the tension between Standard 
House and City Hall. 
 
4.4 Standard House – City Hall Divide    
 
As indicated in Chapter 1, that local government is a highly politicised terrain36 and the perseverance of 
different agendas and interests puts crucial institutions meant for service delivery, such as 
municipalities at the crossroad. Booysen (2012:6) notes that “development is in the hands of the local. 
It is here that government faces pressures. It is an exposed interface” In the larger scheme of things, an 
exploration of the nature of tension between the City Hall and Standard House requires a focus on the 
contradictory nature and politics of the local government as the third sphere of government. Hart 
(2011:3) notes that “local government has long been a key site of contradictions”37.  
                                                          
35
 The phrases ANC REC and Standard House are employed in the study interchangeably. The name of the building where 
the ANC offices are located is called Standard House. Sometimes the name Standard House is used critically to mark bad 
vibes in the organisation. The same can be said with respect to City Hall, where mayoral offices are located.   
36
 Interviewing Zolile Siswana: 14/11/2010 
37
 The permission was sought from the author to cite from the paper as an adherence to his request and this is a common 
practice in academy to do so. 
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The contention by Hart provides a prism from which to examine and situate the nature of the existing 
tensions in the city and how these fragmentations manifest themselves. The tension between the two 
institutions which is the subject under discussion is multifaceted and obscure. It comes across not as a 
policy or ideological divide but what is described as a “battle for control key resources” (Hart; 2011:3). 
The study contends that simmering tensions in the city highlight the contest over the location of power 
and constantly shifting grounds caused by the different conceptions of the centres of power. These 
tensions played out spontaneously in the decision-making processes. The inability of the Standard 
House to influence important decisions in the council such as a appointments of officials in strategic 
positions is a clear indication of the centres of power in the Metro. 
 
 
The names City Hall and Standard House are often employed sarcastically, especially by the media, to 
draw people’s attention to controversies or juicy stories that emanate from either of the institutions. 
Needless to say all forms of factions and divisions require countenances to articulate their respective 
positions and perspectives. In the case of City Hall and Standard House, it appears that the Mayor and 
the ANC Regional Chairman are depicted as faces of these different factions. It seems that the growing 
tensions in the city may give cues regarding formation of factions and contestations in the Metro to 
the ANC elective conference scheduled to take place in December and possible countenances for these 
factions.  The ongoing tensions between these institutions come into the public domain through the 
media as the conflict between Zanoxolo Wayile and Nceba Faku. Such a line of probing has the 
potential to obfuscate the real picture and decode the underlying circumstances.     
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The tensions surfaced spectacularly between City Hall and Standard House prior to local government 
elections that took place in 2011. It is rumoured that the tension was caused partly by the explosive 
findings contained in the Kabuso Report38 on the corruption practices at the NMBM. The report covers, 
but is not limited to the period in which Nceba Faku was a mayor of the city, and it implicates him in 
the wrongdoings. The findings of the Commission have yet to be tested in a court of law, or those 
being fingered in the report be given an opportunity to explain themselves. The Commission was 
instituted after the litany of articles from the media about the extent of corruption in the NMBM. The 
Kabuso Report findings feed into the local politics, power plays and dynamics within the ruling party. It 
also provides ammunition for opposition parties to capitalise on the corruption tendencies by the 
ruling elite. Driving the point home, the nature of findings contained in the report soured the 
relationship between City Hall and Standard House. It comes into view that the findings will be used to 
blemish Faku’s image as a senior political player and current Regional Chairman. He is perceived in his 
party and outside as the main cause of the trouble in the city because of his business interests: Sizani 
(Business Day December 23)39. Ironically, this view was expressed by the leader of the opposition party 
in the NMBM.  
 
As already noted the tensions grew up and as a result, the ruling party sent a task team to find an 
amicable solution to the political infighting that was taking place in the city. The intervention of the 
task team was also necessitated by the concerns of losing the city to the Democratic Alliance (DA). It 
                                                          
38
 Kabuso report is based on the commission led by Kabuso to investigate several lease agreements for the municipal 
facilities and these lease agreements took place during Nceba Faku’s tenure as a mayor of the NMBM 
39
 Some people confide privately that Nceba Faku is the main cause of the ruction in the city. The views advanced in support 
of the allegations ranging from his business interests and micro managing the mayor of the city. 
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appeared that DA was mounting its support base in the region: Stone (Business Day December 23, 
2011). These concerns could not be dismissed outright as the ruling party showed signs vulnerability 
because of the squabbles that were taking place in the organisation. Steyn-Kotze40 has observed that 
“…We have seen a decline in the support for the ANC provincially by as much as 10%. This is significant, 
considering the Eastern Cape is seen as the birthplace and heartland of the ANC” (Business Day 
December 23 2011: Stone.) The ANC was made more susceptible by the notable discontent and revolts 
by the members of the ruling party. The displeasure was caused by the list crisis during the nomination 
period for the local government election. It is worth citing Booysen (2011: 150-151) at length to 
illustrate the point, 
 
The ANC candidate revolts of 2011 directly linked to ANC ward candidacies for local government  
 
elections of 2011. This period was essentially an internal ANC development, yet the protests effortlessly 
 
 fused the party and the state, from the bottom up. The significance of this round of protests was that it  
 
foregrounded intra-ANC competition for positions, or that communities raised candidate’s issues in the  
 
course of their service delivery.  Intra-ANC rivalry had already been present in their earlier protest… Only  
 
some of the 2011 protests, both before and after local election 2011, were of the candidate revolt type…   
 
 
 
Besides internal wrangles in the ANC there were also service delivery protests which were cause for 
concern as they took place before the elections and continued after the elections of local government. 
The protests were mainly driven by service delivery issues and ward councillors’ properties were 
targeted. In the highly contested towns like NMBM the ruling party was concerned about being 
punished by the voters, and such choice of boycotting elections would work in favour of the DA which 
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 SABC interview Sunday 15 May 2011 
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was presented as a threat to ANC dominance. It seemed also that the ruling party did not take the 
prevailing circumstances carelessly, taking into account the oscillation of senior ANC politicians in the 
city including its president to win for support for the local government elections.      
 
 
At the height of the divisions in the city there were serious intimidations from the REC to unseat 
Zanoxolo Wayile as the Executive Mayor of the NMBM owing to his failure to implement ANC policies 
Unknown Author (The Herald November 7, 2011). Nceba Faku41 was reportedly arguing that “it’s ANC 
vision that must be carried out in government. Conference resolutions give a framework (on) how the 
policies of government should be, so that government can pursue the implementation of those 
policies. We must adhere to the ANC policies because of continuity in governance, so that whoever is 
deployed should not seek to implement his or her policies” (The Herald November 7 2011). The cited 
assertion does not help in terms of providing better understanding as to how the Mayor blurred the 
lines in the implementation of programmes.  
 
In sharp contrast, while REC was increasing political pressure for the removal of the mayor, the 
ordinary members of the ANC were veering their discontent about the manner in which the party 
handled the nomination list of councillors for the local government elections. These members were 
equally calling for the dissolution of the REC. This added another element to the political infighting and 
put the ANC in a difficult situation since it had to deal with the threats from its own members. The call 
for the dissolution of the REC before the elective conference was a sign of discontent, and it further 
strengthened Wayile’s chances of holding on to the mayoral position. The REC cannot effect mayoral 
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 Interviewing Nebo Faku 10/02/2011 
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reshuffling without the approval of the ANC provincial leadership, and it seems Wayle is enjoying 
support from the provincial leadership, taking into account the fact that its chairman is from SACP.   
Furthermore, the tension between the City Hall and Standard House revealed new forms of factions in 
the city. Equally important, it showed that both institutions were ‘too weak to impose and very strong 
to frustrate each other42.  
 
Wayile, unlike his predecessor, has political support from the Alliance partners in the region such as 
COSATU and SACP because of his union background. The support Wayile enjoys and continues to draw 
from the Alliance partners points to an interesting development regarding the phenomenon of centres 
of power in the ruling party. It marks the stretching of the definition and rearticulating of the centres of 
power to include the SACP and COSATU to influence the policy direction of the ANC and that of the 
government (Booysen; 2011:463).  Most importantly, the continuing influence of the SACP and 
COSATU as Alliance members demonstrates the shifting grounds in the articulation and 
conceptualisation of the centres of power and shrinking of dominance of the ANC as the vanguard as it 
used to be before the Polokwane conference.  The scenario is not limited to the city because of poltical 
infightings are taking place from other parts of the country and it is an expression of the post-
Polokwane political landscape. The article appeared in The Herald about political tension revealling the 
degree of Wayile’s support in the region from the Alliance partners and how COSATU and SACP seek to 
assert themselves in terms of influencing policy direction. It is worth noting that the reconstruction of 
Wayile as the darling of the Alliance Partners puts him in a coalition cause with ANC leaders who come 
                                                          
42
 See Maphai 1994. The politics of transition since 1990. Implications of the stalemate. 
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from the rank and file background. It feeds into the notion that he lacks a deeper understanding of the 
ANC REC to oust from the mayoral position. 
 
It also appears that there are multiple factors contributing to the tension between the City Hall and 
Standard House. While the REC is accusing City Hall about its failure to implement programmes of the 
party. Standard House is also accused of micro managing the Mayor. In fact, the patent tension 
between City Hall and Standard House is noted by the suspension of senior officials suspected of 
conniving with the REC. It is alleged that “Faku’s ANC faction was also bent on snubbing the mayor, 
undermining, micro-managing and frustrating him by making the political environment intolerable to 
govern effectively” Unknown Author(The Herald November 23 2011). The recent ousting of Ntoba 
from the acting municipal manager position and the suspension of Sitembele Vatala are cases in point. 
The two incumbents are accused of carrying out instructions from their political bosses by frustrating 
the implementation of decisions emanating from the City Hall. The ongoing political infighting and 
tensions in the city put the service delivery process at high risk. As indicated in the previous sections 
that local government is a point of service delivery and an agent for change. The following section will 
attempt to discuss the extent to which the political infighting impacted on service delivery in the 
Metro. 
 
4.5 Service Delivery  
 
The endless political tensions and factionalism in the NMBM between contending blocks for political 
space, put the institution which is responsible for service delivery on its knees. It is worth citing 
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Atkinson (2003:133) that “service delivery is only one side of the coin. The other is effective political 
representation”. Heather Robertson43 (The Herald February 9 2012) in her editorial column notes 
pointedly, “local government has a responsibility not only to deliver services, but to govern efficiently 
so that cities are able to attract investors and stimulate economic growth. Sadly, the future of a city 
and its population seems to be the last thing on the minds of the Bay metro’s governing politicians who 
continue to fight over who gets control the public purse”. On the same note, Leon de Villiers44 
(Weekend Post February 25 2012) argues poignantly that “service delivery in this metro will remain at 
an all-time low until the ongoing political interference by former mayor Nceba Faku and ANC’s 
Regional Executive Committee is stopped”. The point by Robertson and de Villiers alludes to the fact 
that the political infighting in the city has no ideological meaning, but is influenced by personal 
interests45. However, de Villiers point has an oppositional politics undertone, taking into account the 
contest between the ruling party and the DA in the city.   
 
The calamitous relationship between City Hall and Standard House which has been presented in the 
public domain as the tension between Wayile and Faku, has serious ramifications for service delivery in 
the metro. The study has reflected retrospectively that the contest between the Stalini and Stepping 
Stones before and after the Polokwane conference did not do any favour for service delivery in the 
city. Instead, it glaringly undermined the main aim of the local government as a third sphere of 
                                                          
43
 Heather Robertson is Editor of The Herald. The paper is being consistently accused of placing itself as the megaphone for 
the opposition parties in the Metro 
44
 Leon de Villiers, caucus leader for the Democratic Alliance (DA) in the Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality. 
45
 This point was also made by Lerumo Kalako on personal communication basis. He is a former ANC Member of Parliament 
and he lost his seat in parliament after 2009 National Elections because he was perceived as Mbeki’s backer. 
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government. Service delivery is a political issue taking into account the country’s history of racial 
discrimination. Mc Lennan (2001:22) notes judiciously that:  
Since delivery is associated with development, the stakes of non-delivery are politically  
 
high, as it compromises government legitimacy and possibly democratic process. Most  
 
state-driven delivery processes, while apparently technical or managerial, are political,  
 
as they define a power relationship between the state, its citizens and the economy. 
 
 
The litany of service delivery protests which were triggered by the sluggish delivery to the poor 
communities was indicative of a shift in terms of focusing on the core business meant for local delivery.  
Local government is associated with service delivery and it is also where stakes are high in political 
terms. It is essentially about who gets what, when, in what way and for what reason (Mc Lennan; 2001: 
22). Service delivery is sometimes affected by what Booysen (2012:5) refers to as “the quality of local 
government representation and accountability of councillors, at the citizen interface, was often 
unbearably suspect”. Councillors are not appointed by their ability to articulate policies to the officials 
but on factional interests. It is here that the delivery discourse is constantly interrupted and corrupted 
by the political patronage which is driven by the need to have access to material resources. It is so 
because political power is perceived as a step towards economic resource.46  
 
Atkinson (2003:133) has also observed correctly that “municipalities are polities in their own right. 
They are not only bureaucratic edifices; they are also elected directly by the citizenry, and party politics 
plays an important role in municipal governance”. To take the point further, local government has 
                                                          
46
 Interviewing Ollie Setswana 14/11/2010.  
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become a dumping zone for incompetent and amateurish councillors. The number of protests in the 
city as a result of the lack of service delivery point to the lack of capacity from the councillors to deal 
decisively to delivery related matters. In most cases, elected representatives are not considered on the 
basis of their ability to assist the institution in terms of delivering on its mandate but on patronage and 
personal allegiance.  Atkinson (2003:134) notes further that “in many cases, dominant political parties 
have selected candidates for councils on criteria other than merit or developmental potential, with the 
result that councils have become arenas for patronage turf wars and factionalism”. The point by 
Atkinson speaks well to the challenges in the Metro because some of the councillors are not able to 
read and interpret policy documents and their allegiance was used a qualifications for the positions.   
 
 The situation makes the local government sphere as a battle ground for power contests and 
factionalism.  In the process, service delivery, which is the core function of the council, runs the risk of 
not receiving the necessary attention it deserves. Lodge (2004: 213) describes “he scramble for power, 
state resources and a tendency for comrades to regard local structures as their own fiefdom”. The 
study has discusses how power contest and fragmentation at the NMBM manifested themselves and 
what the driving forces behind the political infightings were. As a result, the opposition parties, 
especially the DA, made inroads into the strongholds of the ruling party. Suffices it to say that service 
delivery issues gain prominence during elections, and parties contesting for elections, either are 
national or local, use it raise support. It simply tells that non-delivery service documentation for the 
party in the reins of power could easily hamper its opportunities in terms of growing support for future 
elections.   
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4.6Conclusion 
 
The main aim of this chapter was to dissect the ‘two centres of power’ phenomenon introduced during 
the succession battle for the presidency before the elective congress of the ANC in 2007. It has shown 
that the addition of the lexicon in the political discourse was targeted at dislodging Thabo Mbeki from 
the leadership race. More importantly, the paper examined how the notion of centres of power 
manifested at the NMBM. The tension between the contesting groups in the form Stalini and Stepping 
Stones provided an angle from which to examine this phenomenon in the city. The tension between 
the contesting groups for political space and control came to an abrupt end after the formation of 
COPE. It has been pointed out that most members and leaders of Stepping Stones flocked to the new 
formation. 
 
Tension and political infighting resurfaced in the city but in different form and shape as  
tension between City Hall and Standard House, which has been misrepresented in the public  
domain as a fight between figures. The study suggest that the tension is caused, among other  
issues, by the location of power in the metro. The chapter has delved into the extent of the  
political fighting in the service delivery, and it has concluded that the two do not go well together.  
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                                                                         Chapter 5 
                                                     Manifestations and Conclusions 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The economic policy path to be followed continues to be a contested terrain even after the Polokwane 
Conference of 2007 within the Tripartite Alliance. In addition, the continuation of infighting along the 
factional lines seems not to be in line with the most generally held view that “the 52nd National 
Conference was a watershed for our movement in many respects”47. It has not formulated and 
adopted an alternative path to GEAR policy or made a radical shift from its precepts except offering 
rhetoric to manage the discontent leftists in the Alliance. The ANC has not yet restored stability as 
divisions in the organisation become entrenched in all levels. The programmes being implemented by 
the government reside within the praxis of GEAR policy which was perceived as abhorrence by its 
critics.  The bruising leadership battles and factions that persist in the ruling party can be partly 
attributed to ideological differences but there are also other contingences of factors that spark the 
variation such as access to resources. Surprisingly, dynamics that at play in the provincial and local 
levels in the ANC are not necessarily driven by the ideological differences but by the desire to control 
the state resources. Rather, some of the divisions are sparked by personal loyalties and prospects for 
upward mobility either in government or in the organisation. 
It is worth noting that although local politics come across as symptomatic of national developments 
specific contradictions locally do not necessarily shape power plays nationally. Perhaps these 
                                                          
47
 NGC 2010: Report on the State of the Organisation by ANC Secretary General Gwede Mantashe. See Somadoda Fikeni for 
this view. www.anc.org..za/show.php?id=5946   
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contradictions may give an indication to the national leadership about the balance of forces locally. 
There is no compelling evidence to suggest that local dynamics spillover nationally. It is worth citing 
Booysen (2012:1) to illustrate the point  
 
The local is the incubator, the hothouse, the wind tunnel, often the site of first  
sighting of things to come. Yet, what happens in the local is not predetermined to  
grow into the national phenomena. In many cases timely warnings and political  
action prevent local problems from transferring to the national arena. 
  
The current political infighting in the ANC has taken another turn in most regions and provinces. It has 
become a risky business to attend activities of the party because differences are no longer resolved 
through the power of persuasion but members engage each other physically. The national television 
footages of the ANC regional and provincial conferences paint a picture of the party that is in the mode 
of self-destruction, and derogatory songs are sung not only to communicate the level of divisions 
among the members of the ANC and Alliance, but to articulate leadership preferences in an artistic 
fashion. The use of signs put up crudely in public meetings by the members of the ANC in the presence 
of national leadership to show support or disapproval of candidates for leadership positions, has 
become fashionable despite the fact that it goes against the code of conduct of the organisation. The 
practice by the members of the ruling party points to the fact that the organisation is failing to manage 
its internal affairs and it has also failed to learn some lessons from its 52nd Congress. It seems the 
organisation is undergoing what Lipset (1963:2) describes as “as a complex society…characterised 
either by a constant conflict (even if suppressed) or by consensus, but not a combination of the two”. 
There is no guarantee that the recurring of the these developments in the ANC might not resurfaced in 
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Mangaung, Bloemfontein, and the recent ANC National General Council was also marked by the same 
behaviour. Some members of the national leadership allow these things to happen if they favour their 
wishes as it was the case with Julius Malema at the Polokwane conference.  
 
The cancellation and postponement of regional and provincial conferences of the ANC because of the 
chaotic character they assume have put the organisation in an awkward position in terms of imposing 
authority over its membership. The intensification of deep divisions and chronic factionalism in the 
movement that prevailed before Polokwane still remain a cause for concern. In other words, the point 
made by Booysen might be very difficult to sustain, given the current situation. The study 
demonstrates that the events preceding the ANC Polokwane conference and its outcomes did not only 
change the character of the ANC as a ruling party but also changed the political landscape in South 
Africa significantly. This chapter aims to reflect and discuss trends and manifestations that continue to 
characterize the ANC, and it will do so by examining key issues or findings of the study. The ruling party 
is gradually showing signs that are mostly found in dominant party systems, such as the development 
of opposition within the party. The next section will unpack how the position within the ruling party 
manifests itself. 
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5.2 Opposition within 
 
In dominant party systems the official parties become what Belloni and Beller (1976) call ‘parties of 
pressure’ owing to their failure to muster the necessary electoral support as an alternative. Lodge 
(2003: 5) 
 
The upshot of the opposition that developed within the party in charge of the state apparatus is  
that it does not contribute to the consolidation of democracy as a prerequisite instead to the political  
instability inside the party. The effective distraction in the ANC does not come from the opposition  
parties but from its disgruntled members that challenge ruling party decisions through structures  
outside the organisation such as courts.  
 
The revolts by members of the ANC at the ruling party in 2011 because of dissatisfaction with 
nomination lists for ward councillors present a classical example with which to examine the 
manifestation of opposition within the party that is in governance. Booysen (2011:150) notes that:  
 
The protests in period five characterised by their direct targeting of the ANC itself – rather  
than government structures controlled by the ANC-as- government. Two variants were  
manifested. They were the candidate revolts around election of May 2011 and the  
August / September 2011 around the ANCYL that accompanied the mother body’s  
disciplinary hearing against ANCYL president, Julius Malema, and the rest of the League’s  
top leadership.   
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The ruling party conferences both at regional and provincial level also mask the manifestation of 
opposition within the party. It is a common cause for the factions that are not content with the 
conference procedures and outcomes to run to the courts for intervention rather than approaching 
relevant structures of the party for their grievances. In addition, the failure to pass controversial bills in 
parliament into laws can be attributed to the development of opposition within, though it manifests 
itself government which is another site for intraparty divisions. The ANC in the National Parliament 
wanted to institute disciplinary measures against its Members of Parliament who abstained or decided 
to leave the house rather than voting for the Information Bill, considered to be detrimental with the 
democratic ethos and stifling of access to information. On the same note, Gumede (2012:14) contends 
that: 
…progressive civil society organisations, of which many participated or had genesis 
 in the United Democratic Front (UDF), can also claim legitimacy from the same source.  
It is their responsibility to stop the ANC from backsliding into undemocratic behaviour  
By being assertive civic watchdogs. This role should not be seen as inimical to the alliance  
within the ANC. Pro-democracy activists from the ANC, together with the progressive civil  
society groups, unions and SACP members could, for example, form a pro-democracy lobby  
within the ANC that could push for the total internal democratisation of the party at all  
organisational levels.     
 
The Secretary General of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) presented a document 
to the State Information Bill hearings in parliament which was very critical. The growing frustration of 
the Bill did not only emanate from the opposition and civil society, but from the ANC itself. It is 
COSATU that is causing irritation to the ANC, not SACP.   
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The NMBM is at the crossroads not caused by official opposition but by the internal party differences 
in the ruling party. It has been rendered virtually ineffective in terms of service delivery by the mutual 
recrimination between the Standard House and City Hall which has been going on for more than a 
year. The councillors aligned to the ANC regional chairman Nceba Faku have arduously and deliberately 
rendered the council dysfunctional, and as a result crucial decisions could not be made, as a quorum is 
required for such meetings to take place. It was reported that absent ANC councillors delayed critical 
city projects (The Herald; September 5 2012).  
 
The NMBM is faced with a challenge of filling critical vacancies ranging from municipal manager to 
executive director positions, but reaching a decision on such matters in the council is not easy given 
the existing differences in the ANC. It is also worth noting that the difficulty in appointing suitable 
candidates for the positions has nothing to do with the unavailability of suitable people, but with 
loyalty to the ANC factions that are contesting for political dominance in the region. It is alleged that 
the suspension of the Metro Integrated Development Plan (IDP) director and candidate for the 
municipal manager is part of the purge of officials loyal to Nceba Faku. These developments in the ANC 
reflect the growing of opposition within the ruling party and more importantly, they show the post-
Polokwane political landscape. In other contexts and situations it could be argued that the 
development of opposition within the ruling party is by design to disapprove the current incumbents 
for another term. It makes a perfect sense to argue in that way taking into account the fact that the 
ANC is gearing itself for the national elective conference in December. These contradictions weaken 
the party and service delivery suffers in the process. Gumede (2012:11) argues that: 
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The inability to transform resistance movements into effective governing parties lies  
at the heart of the government failures of many African independence and liberation  
movements, of which the African National Congress (ANC) is a case in point, come to  
power with an extraordinary amount of legitimacy, given their history of opposing  
colonial government or minority rule. 
 
More pointedly, is the failure by the former liberation movements to separate the line between the 
state and the party. The manner in which liberation movements conduct business in governments 
point to the disappointment of treading the line, and the ANC as a ruling party cannot be exonerated 
from blame. The next section will attempt to demonstrate through caveats how the party has crossed 
the line or meddle with the line. 
 
5.3 The border line 
 
The deployment and appointment of cadres to run and manage state apparatus has produced 
unintended consequences for the state and the ruling party. It is failing to advance the cause of 
delivery as it purports to do and those chosen use their positions to access state resources for their 
own benefit. In other cases, the cadre deployment exposed state machinery to all sorts of abuses such 
as settling of political scores and the intraparty divisions. Lodge48 (2003:2) argues that:  
The blurring of state boundaries can be especially dangerous in a context in which  
the identity of party supporters is especially fixed along the lines of social cleavage  
                                                          
48
 The article by Tom Lodge has no name of publication and as a result it cannot be properly referenced. It is entitled:  The 
ANC and the development of party politics in modern South Africa. www.ascleiden.nl/pdf09012003.pdf    
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because the stakes in electoral competition become very high indeed as they do if the  
main contenders are ideological very polarized. State conflation is especially likely  
when parties perceive their role of a hegemonic movement with a epochal  
transformational mission. Such groups are less likely to recognize the legitimacy of their  
opponents and to understand rules and procedures as representing principles rather  
than mere instruments to facilitate their hold on power. 
 
The problems with respect to cadre deployment are common in all spheres of government but in local 
governments the problem is acute. The fact that factions in the ANC at the NMBM are squaring up due 
to their differences regarding deployment of cadres in critical positions speak in volume. As already 
indicated part of the reason that the municipality is struggling to fill the position of a municipal 
manager in the city is the manner in which the deployment of cadres in the state apparatus. The 
process is not only hobbled in finding suitable candidates but also by other factors such as personal 
loyalty. The previous acting municipal manager was ousted for allegedly failing to follow instructions of 
his immediate boss, but carrying out orders from the ANC regional chairman. There is an element of 
truth from Lodge (2003:2) that: 
 
Successive overwhelming electoral victories reduce the importance of the party’s  
activist and hence the influence of membership over leaders. Parties that remain in  
office for length periods often become more subject to factionalism, that is conflict  
between informal groupings within the party constituted around particular leaders,  
as the party’s capacity to control public appointments and direct state contracting become  
ever more deeply entrenched and hence the power party notables as patrons more  
pronounced. Political appointments can blur the boundaries between the party and  
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sate to such a degree that the party loses its capacity to reflect the preoccupation of citizens.  
 
The assertion by Lodge points to the crux of the matter that the political appointments are done as 
rewards for personal loyalties. It is also the appointment of officials and awarding of lucrative tenders 
that has also soured the relationship between City Hall and Standard House in the NMBM. In the 
widely publicised interview between the local newspaper and ANC chairperson Nceba Faku, he argued 
that the mayor had appointed officials and awarded tenders to companies without consulting the 
structures of the ruling party. Belloni and Beller (1996:538) suggest that “rewards are essential to the 
maintenance of factions and may take either form of material gains or certain psychological 
satisfactions – in membership and leadership”. It is through the appointment of people along factional 
lines and allegiances that the state resources are captured. In many instances these appointments are 
not supported by the acumen required in those positions but patronage takes precedent and line 
between the state and the party is mostly risked under such conditions. Such appointees do not 
separate the lines between administration and the political work49. Suffices it to say that in the 
evolving factions and entrenchment of divisions at the NMBM the line between the state and party is 
so blurred.  
 
The discordant relationship between City Hall and Standard House attests to that and it is not grass 
that continue to suffer but the service delivery. Boucek (2010:129) asserts that “the danger with 
dividing the spoils along the factional lines is the privatisation of incentives. Self-serving behaviour is 
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 Interviewing Chalk Portgieter  30/03/2011 
89 
 
encouraged by redirecting attention away from the collective good of the party and towards the 
narrow interests of faction leaders”. It is worthwhile noting that the discussed matters existed before 
the ANC 52nd Congress of 2007, but the practice increased exponentially and in varying degrees in all 
spheres of government reflectively of the political landscape.  Booysen (2011:158) notes that, “in many 
instances of protests, the direct objective was simply to get service delivery or the correction by the 
local government of a substantive or municipal managerial problem… Service delivery issues were 
among the reasons, and almost always featured, but not the sole motivation. The service delivery in 
point ranged from sanitation to housing or roads…”. The headlines in The Herald “Is what you voted 
for?” capture brilliantly the extent of the damage of the deep divisions in the Metro with respect to 
service delivery. The article notes that “the postponement also stalls the implementation of important 
service delivery projects which were given the nod when the 2012/13 budget was passed month” 
Unknown Author (The Herald; July 13, 2012).  
 
It is difficult to establish at this stage to what degree the divisions along factional lines in the city by 
any chance have something to do with the forthcoming ANC 53rd Congress that is going to take place in 
December. But the under currency50 seems to suggest that the main political rivals in the region are 
likely to split their support for candidates for the coming national conference. 
 
 
                                                          
50
 The word under currency is used to note that the nomination process for the elective congress has not officially started 
but lobbying is undergoing clandestinely.  
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5.4 Conclusion 
 
The contest between Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma for the ANC presidency in 2007 changed the 
character of the organisation. The factions and divisions that punctuated the contest for the leadership 
positions continue to prevail even after the Polokwane conference. In the NMBM the Regional 
Executive Committee (REC) of the ANC was disbanded purely due to its support for Mbeki. The new 
REC immediately flexed its muscle by ousting the executive mayor of the city, Nondumiso Maphazi. 
The premier of the province, Nosimo Balindlela, fell a victim when she was recalled as the premier of 
the province. What changed the political landscape after Polokwane conference completely was the 
recall of Thabo Mbeki as the President of the Republic of South Africa when he had a few months to 
finish his term, which eventually led to the formation of COPE. In other words, the formation of COPE 
was by and large triggered by the ousting of Mbeki. 
 
As the study was concerned with the existence of factions and factionalism in political parties the 
literature reviewed points to the fact that factionalism is the ‘pathology of politics’. However, the 
phenomenon is symptomatic of a dominant party system, and it is prevailing in the ANC precisely 
because it is a dominant political force in South African politics.  The study has presented the fact that 
factions are triggered by a contingency of factors such as patronage, access to resources and contest 
for political power. Put it in another way, the dominant political system provides fertile grounds for 
factionalism to grow owing to the distribution of spoils and tendency alignment. It is also worth 
mentioning that despite the loaded negative connotations associated with the practice it has other 
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spin-offs such as broadening of the space for the marginalised to articulate their views on ideological 
matters and leadership preferences. 
 
The revolt against Thabo Mbeki prior the conference by the members of the organisation was not a 
spontaneous action but was orchestrated by his political nemesis in the ANC. The ‘gathering storm’ 
metaphor as discussed in Chapter 3 of the research paper reveals the underlying circumstances that 
led to and influenced the mood at the conference. It remains to be seen whether the open contest for 
the leadership position enhances the internal democracy in the ANC, taking into account the current 
state of affairs in the organisation. Since the Polokwane conference and the recall of Mbeki, the 
organisation has not yet reached stability necessary as the ruling party owing to the deep divisions. The 
usage of state agencies to spy on people perceived to be enemies is becoming an acceptable practice 
in the body politic. 
 
The two centres of power and their implications continue to manifest in the NMBM. The acrimonious 
relationship between Standard House and City Hall provided a space from which to examine the 
matters and their impact on service delivery. The political infighting in the Metro along factional lines 
took many directions. Initially, the battle was between the supporters of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma 
which led to the formation of Stepping Stones and Stalini as a demarcation line between the 
contending groups for political dominance. The study has suggested that service delivery suffered 
severely as the battle was intensified. 
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After the formation of COPE the political landscape in the city changed dramatically and camps 
supporting their respective leadership for the 52nd Congress disappeared. However, the disappearance 
of Stalini and Stepping Stones did not necessarily translate into the end of factions in the region. The 
tension between the Mayor and the ANC regional chairperson took the direction of factionalism and 
produced incumbents to articulate their respective positions in the public domain. The study has 
clearly that the ongoing spat between the two forces has impacted on service delivery. Equally 
important, the power plays and factions are imbued by the desire to control state resources. In the 
main, the line between the state and the party has been risked through the deployment of political 
activists in key state positions. Suffices it to say that in most cases the deployment of cadres to manage 
state machinery comes across as rewards for personal loyalties, and breeds corruption. 
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